The Hedge Fund Industry is Bigger (and has Performed Better) Than You Think

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The Hedge Fund Industry is Bigger (and has Performed Better) Than You Think*

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Abstract

Of first-order importance to the study of potential systemic risks in hedge funds is the aggregate size of the industry. The worldwide hedge fund industry has been estimated by regulators and industry experts as having total net assets under management of $2.3 – 3.7 trillion as of the end of 2016. Using a newly combined database of several hedge fund information vendors, augmented by the first detailed, systematic regulatory collection of data on large hedge funds in the United States, we estimate that the worldwide net assets under management were at least $5.2 trillion in 2016, over 40% larger than the most generous estimate. Gross assets, which represent the balance sheet value of hedge fund assets, exceeds $8.5 trillion. We further decompose hedge fund assets by their self-reported strategy and by fund domicile. We also show that the total returns earned by funds that report to the public databases are significantly lower than the returns of funds that report only on regulatory filings, both in aggregate and within nearly every fund strategy. This difference appears to be driven entirely by alpha, rather than by differences in exposures to systematic risk factors. However, net investor flows are considerably higher for funds reporting publicly, suggesting previous estimates of the flow-performance relationship are likely biased. Our new, and much larger, estimates of the size of the hedge fund industry should help regulators and prudential authorities to better gauge the systemic risks posed by the industry, and to better evaluate potential data gaps in private funds. Our results also suggest that systematic risk is roughly similar in publicly and non-publicly reporting funds.

Key words: Hedge funds, net assets, gross assets, strategy, domicile, returns, flows

JEL: G23, G28

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1 Introduction

At least since the wind-down of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998, hedge funds have been widely recognized as having the potential to pose systemic risks to financial markets.\(^1\) The use of leverage, illiquidity of holdings, and the interconnectedness of hedge funds with other major financial market participants, such as prime brokers and repurchase agreement (repo) counterparties, further demonstrates the importance of hedge funds in the financial system. Additionally, the rapidly increasing scale of the industry, reflected in aggregate assets under management and its corresponding widespread clientele base, magnify concerns about the potential systemic importance of hedge funds.\(^2\)

Despite the interest in the hedge fund industry from both regulators and market participants, the basic fact of the total size of the industry remains an open question. Just how large is the worldwide hedge fund industry in terms of total assets under management (AUM)? And, how is the scale of the industry distributed among different hedge fund strategies and geographic regions? The potential data gaps in hedge fund activities are not confined to questions of size; the extent to which hedge fund performance and investor flows have been comprehensively measured is similarly uncertain.

Reliable estimates of these quantities have proven elusive because, until recently, regulatory data collections on hedge fund activities were limited. This left public hedge fund vendor databases, such as Hedge Fund Research (HFR) and Lipper TASS, as the most readily available data to industry observers. However, such vendors collect data from funds on a purely voluntary basis, and many of the very largest hedge funds choose not to list in any of the vendor databases (Edelman, Fung, and Hsieh (2013) (EFH)).\(^3\) Yet, it is exactly these mega hedge funds that may pose the largest systemic threats to financial markets (e.g., Long-Term Capital Management in 1998). While recent regulatory collections in the U.S. and Europe attempt to fill this gap, estimates based on these collections remain incomplete due to a lack of jurisdictional overlap.

The impediments to accurate estimates of the size of the worldwide hedge fund industry are evident from the dispersion of these estimates: Eurekahedge ($2.33 trillion); Hedge Fund Research (HFR) ($3.21 trillion); eVestment ($3.25 trillion); Barclay Hedge ($3.54 trillion); and Preqin ($3.55 trillion) comprise merely a subset of such

\(^1\) More recently, the Dodd-Frank Act, Section IV, requires large U.S. hedge funds to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and to file periodic reports (either annual or quarterly) of their activities, a reflection of the growing concerns of Congress about the activities and scale of hedge funds.

\(^2\) Size and interconnectedness are two of the basic factors stipulated in the Dodd Frank Act to determine whether a financial institution is “systemically important”.

\(^3\) EFH collect historical printed volumes, over a 10-year period, from Institutional Investor’s annual "Hedge Fund 100,” which is a list of the 100 largest hedge fund firms, and Absolute Return+Alpha magazine’s semiannual "Billion Dollar Club,” which is a list of all firms managing $1 billion or more in assets.
estimates. The vast majority of publicly available estimates fall between $3.0-3.5 trillion. The largest publicly available estimate to date is $3.89 trillion, which comes from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) estimate based on regulatory data as of the fourth quarter of 2017.

In this paper, we provide the most precise estimate to date of the size and performance of the hedge fund industry. To do so, we combine data from seven public hedge fund data vendors with the first-ever systematic regulatory collection of data on large hedge funds. Based on this newly aggregated data, our conclusion is that the industry is considerably larger than any existing estimate. We estimate the hedge fund industry is at least $5.2 trillion in net assets under management as of the end of 2016, over 40% larger than the next largest estimate. Our estimates are larger because they are based on are more comprehensive set of hedge fund data than those used by regulators or vendors; quite simply, each previous estimate has missed a significant portion of the industry, and our approach is able, in part, to close this gap.

Next, we estimate the total gross assets under management in the industry, which represent assets purchased with investor equity capital as well as with borrowing. Gross assets likely better represent the true economic exposures of hedge funds. Unsurprisingly, due to the non-trivial leverage used by many funds, our estimates of total gross assets are considerably larger than estimated total net AUM. We estimate gross AUM exceed $8.5 trillion, implying an average leverage ratio of around 1.6 to 1 across all funds. When we augment gross assets with regulatory assets reported on Form ADV for funds that report neither publicly nor to Form PF, total gross assets exceed $8.7 trillion. For comparison, this makes the hedge fund industry’s economic footprint almost 90% as large as total home loan mortgage debt in the United States, which stands at roughly $10 trillion.

Based on our more complete accounting of hedge fund assets, we then separate public versus non-public net assets by fund strategy and fund domicile. While the substantial number of funds reporting their strategy as “Other” on Form PF make comparisons between publicly reporting and non-publicly reporting funds difficult, we nonetheless find that some strategies are better represented in the public data than others. Publicly reporting Macro and Credit funds comprise 61% and 76% of total gross assets, respectively, while Multi-strategy and Relative Value funds comprise only 43%. Unsurprisingly, the publicly reported data under-represents the net assets in U.S. domiciled funds relative to the (U.S.) regulatory data, but significantly over-represents European domiciled fund assets. If the patterns of non-reporting U.S. funds are a reasonable proxy for non-reporting European funds, our data suggest the

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4All estimates are as of 2017. Eurekahedge corresponds to the third quarter, whereas all others correspond to the fourth quarter.
“missing” European funds’ assets may indeed be substantial. This further highlights that our estimates of global hedge fund AUM may understate the industry’s true size.

Finally, our data allow us to undertake a more thorough assessment of aggregate industry performance and net investor flows. Accurately measuring performance is crucial for understanding which risk factors hedge funds are exposed to as well as the sensitivity of investor capital to historical returns. Each is critical for evaluating the potential financial stability consequences of hedge fund activities. We find that the total returns earned by funds that do not report to any of the public hedge fund databases are dramatically higher than for publicly-reporting funds. This performance difference is evident both in aggregate and within nearly every fund strategy. The total return to the AUM-weighted average portfolio of non-publicly reporting funds is 26.6% over the period 2013-2016; comparatively, the total return to the value-weighted portfolio of funds reporting to at least one public database is 9.4% over the same period.

The outperformance of non-publicly reporting funds could be due either to greater risk-adjusted returns (alphas), or greater exposure to systematic risks such as the return to the overall stock market or aggregate liquidity. Understanding the source of these observed higher returns therefore has important implications for systemic risk. If non-publicly reporting funds are both larger and earn higher returns through greater risk exposures, fund performance could be particularly poor during times of economic stress. This could serve to magnify declining prices across a variety of markets, or lead to forced liquidations during times when prices are already depressed. Instead, if return differences are due largely to differences in mean returns, then systematic risks may be no bigger in the larger, non-publicly reporting funds than in the smaller, publicly reporting funds.

We find that the entire outperformance of publicly reporting funds is due to differences in alphas. We use the bootstrap approach of Fama and French (2010) to create a synthetic sample of hedge fund returns that are zero-alpha by construction. This sample maintains all of the empirical characteristics of actual, realized returns but imposes that alpha in each fund is zero. We can then compare actual, realized alphas to a set of samples bootstrapped from the zero alpha distribution. We find that while publicly-reporting funds show no statistical evidence of alpha, non-publicly reporting funds show substantial alphas. Further, the distributions of the zero-alpha bootstrapped samples are almost identical across publicly and non-publicly reporting funds, suggesting that the publicly and non-publicly reporting funds differ only in mean returns, and that systematic risk exposures between the two are highly similar.

Lastly, we examine investor flows. The sensitivity of flows to performance has important consequences for financial stability. If funds face large redemptions during periods of poor performance, they may be forced to sell assets quickly and at steep discounts. In the extreme case, this could lead to fire sales in particular markets or assets.
While the performance of publicly-reporting funds is substantially lower than funds that do not report publicly, investor flows into publicly-reporting funds are substantially higher. This pattern once again holds both in aggregate and within fund strategies. This is consistent with funds using public data vendors as a tool to raise investor capital, and with large funds (who are less likely to report publicly) nearing their investment capacity. These returns and flows results call into the question the reliability of previous estimates of the flow-performance relationship in hedge funds, and demonstrate that even the union of seven public hedge fund databases may be insufficient to produce representative statistics on the industry as a whole.

Our empirical methodology is straightforward, yet made possible by complicated matching tasks between funds in public databases and publicly available regulatory information. We first construct a sample of publicly-reporting funds as the (mathematical) union of a matched sample of seven public hedge fund databases: HFR, Lipper TASS, Preqin, Barclay Hedge, Eurekahedge, Morningstar, and eVestment. Next, we take the full set of unique hedge funds from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Form ADV (a publicly available filing), and name-match these funds to the merged public data. This determines which Form ADV funds provide information to one of the public hedge fund data services, and associates an SEC identifier with each publicly reporting fund that also reports on ADV. Finally, we collect data from Form PF — the first U.S. regulatory collection of data on hedge funds that have an economically significant size. We then exclude from Form PF any fund that already reports to one of the public databases, which we are able to determine from the matching exercise between the public data and (public) Form ADV. This gives us data for funds that don’t report to any public database. The combination of data reported to the public data services, and those reported on Form PF but not to any public data services, generates our combined sample of publicly and non-publicly reporting funds.

To our knowledge, the only other paper that attempts to document the level of hedge fund AUM that is not reported to vendor databases is EFH. Specifically, EFH estimate that the hedge fund industry is 65% larger than a consolidation of three vendor databases (BarclayHedge, HFR, and TASS) would suggest, based on data from 2010. We find that a replication of the mega funds methodology from EFH produces an estimate of industry size that is $1.2 trillion larger than that obtained only from the public data. Alternatively, the Form PF data contribute an additional $2.7 trillion, or roughly $1.5 trillion more than would be added using the EFH methodology. This further highlights the contribution of this paper beyond what has previously been provided in the literature.

We note that our estimates of worldwide hedge fund AUM are conservative. We exclude all funds-of-funds from our public data, as well as funds that do not report on Form PF or to the public data, but that do report regulatory

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7We exclude fund-of-funds to avoid double-counting; however, some fund-of-funds may hold underlying funds that are not otherwise
AUM on Form ADV. In addition, hedge fund advisers who manage total private fund AUM below $150 million are not required to file Form PF in the U.S. – if they also do not list in a public database, we do not capture their AUM either. Perhaps most importantly, funds with no U.S. investors that do not report to any of the public databases will also be excluded from our analysis, since they are not required to file as investment advisers with the SEC. Based on the small-size bias in public data (EFH), these funds may represent a non-trivial portion of industry assets. Thus, while our estimates are considerably larger than any existing estimate, they likely still represent an underestimate of the true size of the industry.

Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the databases used in our study, as well as the matching procedures we use to link them together. Section 3 provides empirical results on the size of the worldwide hedge fund industry. Section 4 delineates assets under management by strategy and fund domicile. Section 5 examines fund returns. Section 6 studies investor flows. Section 7 concludes.

2 Data

2.1 Public Hedge Fund Data

To form the data set from the publicly available hedge fund databases (what we call the public data), we consolidate seven major commercial hedge fund databases: Lipper TASS, Hedge Fund Research (HFR), BarclayHedge, EurekaHedge, Morningstar, Preqin, and eVestment. Each database contains fund characteristics (e.g., investment style, compensation structure, and liquidity provisions), which we harmonize across databases, and monthly time series of returns and net asset values (NAVs), which we restrict to monthly net-of-fees returns and convert to US dollars using rates we obtain from Bloomberg. We assign each database-level fund with a harmonized public fund and firm identifier. Our identifiers are common across and within databases. Harmonization within databases is important because, except for Preqin, individual databases assign distinct fund identifiers to share classes of the same fund (e.g., onshore and offshore classes). For additional details about the construction of the merged public data, we refer the reader to Joenvaara, Kauppila, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2019).

To calculate the total value of public NAV, we sum the individual fund-level NAV in each month and year across all seven databases. To avoid double-counting, we take great care to ensure we include only one NAV observation per fund in each period, and exclude all funds-of-funds. In cases where a fund reports different NAV values to included in our aggregation (due, e.g., to being too small for Form PF and choosing not to list in any vendor database). Any such funds will be missed in our aggregation.

8The value of Regulatory Assets Under Management is effectively the market value of any securities portfolio; a securities portfolio is any portfolio with at least 50% of the value in securities, where securities include cash and cash equivalents. See https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf, section 5.F for more details.
different public databases, we use the average. Because funds may manage multiple share classes (e.g., onshore and offshore classes), each of which represent a separate pool of managed assets that should be included in the total, this summation may include multiple share classes within the same fund. In cases where one share class constitutes a master share class whose NAV represents the total NAV of the fund across all share classes, we use only the master share class in the summation. To calculate quarterly public NAV at fund level, we use the latest non-missing monthly NAV within the quarter.

2.2 Form PF

For non-public hedge fund data, we use fund-level regulatory data from the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Form PF (“Private Fund”). Form PF was established in a joint rule-making by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in 2011 to fulfill a mandate in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“DFA”) to collect data that allows monitoring of large private funds. Except for a short period in 2006, when hedge funds were required to register with the SEC (Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008)), Form PF constitutes the first detailed regulatory data collection of various hedge fund activities in the United States. Form PF has different reporting requirements for hedge fund advisers of different sizes, and no reporting requirement for advisers who manage less than $150 million in aggregate hedge fund assets. All investment advisers registered with the SEC who manage at least $150 million in private fund assets (which include hedge funds, private equity funds, and liquidity funds), must file Form PF at least annually, and report information on gross and net asset values, gross and net returns, total borrowings, strategy classifications, investor composition, and their largest counterparties. Large Hedge Fund Advisers — those with at least $1.5 billion in assets managed in hedge funds — are required to report this information quarterly for each of their Qualifying Hedge Funds — funds with a net asset value of at least $500 million — as well as more detailed information regarding portfolio, investor, and financing liquidity; asset class exposures; collateral posted; risk metrics; and more.

Form PF data are confidential. The Office of Financial Research has access to the data through an agreement with the SEC. The form itself is publicly available and can be downloaded here: [https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf](https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf).

Form ADV, also filed with the SEC, is a public source of some limited hedge fund data. See [https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersformadvhtm.html](https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersformadvhtm.html). Form PF, however, requires much more granularity in reporting than that required by Form ADV.

Non-U.S.-domiciled advisers are not required to report private fund assets that are not organized in the U.S. and are not offered to U.S. investors. Detailed investment adviser registration requirements can be found at: [https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/olia/olia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf](https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/olia/olia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf).

The thresholds for filing Form PF and for the “Large Hedge Fund Adviser” classification are on a gross basis, but the threshold for “Qualifying Hedge Fund” status is on a net basis, and is as of the last day in any month in the fiscal quarter immediately preceding the adviser’s most recently completed fiscal quarter. Moreover, when determining whether a reporting threshold is met, advisers must aggregate the asset values of the funds themselves, associated parallel funds, dependent parallel managed accounts, and master-feeder funds. Advisers must also include these items for related persons that are not separately operated. Finally, while reporting thresholds are determined on an
Because many large funds do not report to any of the public hedge fund data services (EFH), and such data services predominantly comprise smaller funds, Form PF offers an unprecedented view of the activities of some of the largest hedge funds offered to U.S. investors. The lack of public reporting by many large funds is the primary reason estimates of the size of the hedge fund industry based on public databases are too small.

2.3 Matching Procedure

To calculate the total size of the hedge fund industry, we aggregate the total net assets of funds that report to one or more of the public databases and the net assets of funds reporting to Form PF, without double-counting funds that report to both. To do so, we first match the public data to regulatory data contained in SEC’s Form ADV.

Form ADV is a publicly available filing that requires investment advisers to report, on an aggregated basis, information on the private funds that they advise. Form ADV also requires advisers to list the SEC identifier (an “805-” number) of each private fund advised by the adviser.

To match SEC identifiers to funds in the public data, we first collect the names and SEC identifiers of all private funds identified by their adviser as “hedge funds” on Form ADV. Next, we match each ADV-reporting hedge fund name with public fund name clusters, which group similarly named funds across the seven public databases. We then tentatively assign each ADV fund name to the cluster which contains its closest public fund name. Next, we manually verify and correct these tentative matches, using the public adviser name and Form ADV adviser name as context clues. If a private fund cannot be matched to a reasonably similar public fund cluster, we mark it as a non-matched private fund during the manual verification. For these non-matched private funds, our only fund-level data come from Form PF. Finally, to resolve the mapping of SEC fund identifiers to individual public funds (not clusters), for each fund name (and its associated SEC identifier) in ADV, we pick the closest public fund name appearing in the matching original (uncorrected) name cluster.

The value of matching the funds in the public data to funds in ADV is that the SEC identifiers are common between Form ADV and Form PF. This allows us to determine whether a given fund reporting to Form PF has also reported net assets to one of the public databases. To estimate the total net assets of hedge funds that do not report to any of the public databases, we add up the net assets reported on Form PF for funds that were not matched to any
fund in any of the public databases, or for funds that were matched but do not report net asset values to any public database. Many funds that report returns and other information to public databases often do not provide information on net assets. Thus, the net assets we calculate from Form PF are associated with funds that either (i) do not report to any public database, or (ii) report to a public database but do not provide data on their net assets. We note that, due to data restrictions associated with confidential Form PF data, for funds that appear in both Form PF and at least one of the public databases, we use the value of the assets reported to the public database rather than to Form PF. While the regulatory data are likely more accurate in cases where the net assets are reported to both Form PF and a public database, confidentiality requirements make using the regulatory data unfeasible in such cases.

Finally, we note that there is no formal definition of a “hedge fund.” In order to avoid including private funds that are not properly considered hedge funds, we only include funds that report to public hedge fund databases, or funds that categorize themselves as a hedge fund on Form PF. We note that some funds file as a hedge fund on Form ADV, but file as an “Other” private fund on Form PF. Out of an abundance of caution, such funds are not included in our analysis.

3 The Size of the Hedge Fund Industry

3.1 Net Assets Under Management

Our estimate of the size of the hedge fund industry is the aggregation of net assets reported to the public databases (public net assets), plus net assets reported on Form PF excluding funds that report net assets to any of the public databases (non-public net assets). As noted previously, we are not able to capture data for funds that are listed neither in Form PF nor the union of public databases. This will include small hedge funds that do not meet the minimum size threshold for regulatory reporting, or large funds that are not required to register with the SEC (for example, funds with no U.S. resident investors). These “omitted assets” can be substantial, as suggested by EFH, who show that very large hedge funds often do not report to public vendors.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, while our estimates of the size of the hedge fund industry are substantially larger than any prior estimates, we are nonetheless still likely to underestimate the industry’s true size.

The top panel of Figure 1 plots the time series of net assets for funds that report net assets to at least one of the public databases, as well as for funds that do not report net assets to any of the public data, but do report on Form PF. The total net assets of funds reporting to at least one public database is just over $2.5 trillion as of December 14. We also cannot capture the perhaps thousands of very small hedge funds, even in the U.S., that choose not to market themselves through vendor databases—and are too small to be required to be included in a Form PF filing.

\(^{14}\text{We also cannot capture the perhaps thousands of very small hedge funds, even in the U.S., that choose not to market themselves through vendor databases—and are too small to be required to be included in a Form PF filing.}\)
2016. The total net assets of funds that do not report net assets to any of the public databases, but do report to Form PF, is $2.7 trillion, larger than the net assets reported across the entirety of the publicly available data. Note that this disparity excludes funds that report to both the public databases and Form PF, as the net assets for such funds are included in the calculation of public net assets (and not in the calculation of non-public net assets).

The times-series of total net assets (both public and private) is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. In total, the combination of publicly-reporting and non-publicly reporting funds’ net assets is $5.2 trillion as of the end of 2016. This is about 42% larger than the next highest estimate of $3.66 trillion as of December 2016, which is provided by the SEC using (only) data derived from Form PF. We note that our estimate is not larger due to a new estimation technique or imputation procedure; rather, our estimates are larger simply because we have a larger cross-section of funds than has been previously available in any other analyses. The bottom row of Panel A in Table 1 reports the precise values of public and non-public net assets, as well as their total, as of year-end for the period 2013–2016.

Further, while the net assets reported to public databases have slightly declined since mid-2015, the net assets reported to Form PF, but not to the public data, have grown steadily over the 2013-2016 period. From first quarter 2013 to fourth quarter 2016, public net assets have grown from $2.1 to $2.5 trillion (a 19% increase), while non-public net assets have grown from $1.8 to $2.7 trillion (a 49% increase). This further highlights the importance of regulatory data to build a more precise estimate of the size and growth of the industry.

We also note that while the regulatory data are an important source of information not available in the public data, it is also incomplete. Figure 2 shows the time-series of total net assets managed by funds with no corresponding SEC identifier; that is, for funds with no requirement to report to Form PF or Form ADV. As of 2016, such funds managed nearly $1.4 trillion in net assets, which demonstrates a significant data gap in U.S. regulatory collections of global hedge fund data. While U.S. regulatory agencies have no direct oversight over such funds, they nonetheless are likely to participate in U.S. financial markets and may engage with U.S. counterparties.

Finally, we can compare the incremental increase in net assets due to the inclusion of Form PF data to that which would be achieved through the inclusion of “mega funds.” Edelman, Fung, and Hsieh (2013) show that estimates of net assets for some of the largest hedge funds are available through various public sources, including the HFM Absolute Return Billion Dollar Club list, the Top 100 Hedge Fund list, and the Top 50 European Hedge Fund list. Does Form PF, which captures data on larger funds, contribute any additional information about industry size beyond what could be obtained through these publications alone? The answer is yes. The inclusion of data from these sources would add an additional $1.197 to our existing public-data estimate of $2.5 trillion, bringing the total to roughly $3.7 trillion. Instead, the Form PF data contribute an additional $2.7 trillion, more than $1.5 trillion more in net assets.
than would be captured from these additional sources. Thus, our tabulation of hedge fund assets greatly exceeds even the most earnest previous attempts to classify the true size of the hedge fund industry.

### 3.2 Gross Assets Under Management

A well-known feature of hedge funds is the use of balance sheet leverage. Balance sheet leverage arises from the investment of borrowed funds — generally through collateralized borrowing (e.g., securities lending or repurchase agreement borrowing) or through direct borrowing from the fund’s prime brokers — and simultaneously increases the assets and liabilities of the fund. All else equal, leverage increases the magnitudes of gains and losses of an investment strategy relative to the payoff of the strategy funded only by investor capital. Because hedge fund investments are funded by both investor capital and borrowing, the gross assets of the fund are a better measure of funds’ economic exposures and potential systemic risk to various sectors of financial markets than net assets, which only represent the equity capital of the fund.\footnote{The so-called “Quant Crisis” of August 2007 illustrated that deleveraging by some very large hedge funds very likely was responsible, in part, for the dislocation in financial markets (Khandani and Lo (2011)). Another example is the panic created by the specter of a large “wind-down” by Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998.}

Form PF explicitly collects the gross assets of reporting hedge funds in addition to their net assets, giving us a direct and reliable measure of funds’ balance sheet leverage.\footnote{Balance sheet leverage is simply gross assets divided by net assets.} Unfortunately, the public databases only collect this information for a subset of funds, as fund leverage is a potentially sensitive part of a fund’s strategy. For public funds, we calculate funds’ gross asset values (GAV) by scaling the NAV reported to the public database by the funds reported leverage ratio. If the leverage ratio is not reported, we impute it as the NAV-weighted mean leverage ratio within the same quarter and investment style of publicly reporting funds. If the fund reports multiple leverage ratios that differ across databases, we use the median.

While our approach for determining leverage in public funds is likely to suffer from estimation error, the average leverage we estimate for public funds is highly sensible. We estimate average leverage of 1.54, which is nearly identical to the average level of 1.63 estimated from Form PF. An alternative approach to estimating gross assets in public funds that simply multiplies public net assets by average leverage (in total or by strategy) estimated from Form PF would therefore produce highly similar results.

The top panel of Figure 3 shows the value of gross assets separately for publicly and non-publicly reporting funds, and the bottom panel shows their total. Our estimates indicate that gross assets in the hedge fund industry exceed $8.5 trillion at the end of 2016. By comparison, total U.S. home loan mortgage debt is roughly $10 trillion; that is, hedge fund gross assets are about 85% as large as the entire U.S. home loan mortgage industry. Note, again,
the higher growth rate of gross assets of the non-publicly reporting funds over the sample period.

We make one additional modification to our estimates of hedge fund gross assets using Form ADV. Because investment advisers must report to Form ADV if their total regulatory assets under management (gross assets) exceed $150 million, while advisers only report to Form PF if their private regulatory assets under management exceed $150 million, there are some hedge funds that report on Form ADV but not on Form PF. For these hedge funds, we add their gross assets to our measure of total gross assets from Form PF. We again exercise an abundance of caution by excluding funds that report either as a master or a feeder fund on Form ADV, that categorize themselves as a fund-of-funds, or that are a parallel fund in a parallel fund structure. The addition of these funds increases our estimates of gross assets by roughly $200 billion, pushing our estimates of total gross hedge fund assets above $8.7 trillion. The time-series of gross assets that include data Form ADV is shown in Figure 4.

4 Size by Strategy and Fund Domicile

4.1 Net and Gross Assets by Fund Strategy

Panel A of Table 1 decomposes the size of the industry by strategy category. Our strategy classifications are derived from Form PF, which asks funds to report the fraction of their assets that fall into each of 22 pre-selected strategy categories. These 22 categories fall under eight broader categories: Equity, Relative Value, Macro, Event Driven, Managed Futures, Credit, Invests in Other Funds, and Other. We classify funds that have less than 75% of AUM in any particular category as Multi-strategy funds. Because net assets that are invested in other private funds are excluded from NAV values in Form PF (to avoid double-counting), rather than exclude funds-of-funds from the strategy classification, we simply include them in the Other category. Note that the net assets of funds-of-funds included in any of our aggregates necessarily reflect direct investments of investor equity capital.

For the public data, we manually allocate funds to a strategy based on the Form PF categorization. The details of the specific mapping from self-reported strategy in the public data to Form PF strategy categories are shown in the Appendix.

The first observation from Table 1 is that researchers using public data, even if it is aggregated across all major vendors, miss a large fraction of funds within each strategy category. This calls into question the robustness of the conclusions found in the numerous previous hedge fund studies that rely exclusively on data from public sources.17 This issue is particularly salient given the non-random nature of reporting to public databases.

Table 1 shows that in 2013 the most under-represented strategies are the Multi-strategy and Other categories, for

17A salient example is the numerous very large hedge funds that do not report to public databases, as per EFH.
which public databases comprise only 40% and 8% of reported net assets, respectively. By the end of 2016, several more categories join the “majority-missing from public data” set — specifically, Equity, Event-Driven, and Relative Value. This means that by 2016, more than half of all strategies had less than half of worldwide net assets accounted for by funds in any of the seven public databases — a substantial data gap by any measure. A similar result is found from gross assets, which is shown in Panel B.

One confounding factor in this analysis is the size of the Other category in the Form PF data. Publicly reporting funds, which presumably intend to raise additional capital, are incentivized to provide prospective investors with a clear strategy mandate. No such incentive exists in Form PF data, and funds are allowed to indicate that no broad strategy category fits their specific investment objective. In this case, funds are allowed to select the strategy “Other” and write in a self-reported strategy description. While our Form PF strategy classifications include manually assigning funds to a pre-selected strategy in cases where their write-in responses suggest such an assignment is appropriate, for many funds such a mapping is not possible. This may suggest that assets in the Other category in Form PF data are artificially inflated, and the over-representation of publicly-reporting funds in certain strategy categories simply results from too many Form PF funds being categorized as Other when a standard category is suitable.

However, the size of the Other assets in Form PF funds may not solely result from noisy data. If funds with particularly unique or bespoke strategies are also the most harmed by or susceptible to reverse-engineering or front-running, then such funds would face the highest costs of reporting to public databases. We should then expect that the Other category in Form PF would be significantly larger than the Other category in public databases, because managers of rightly categorized Other strategies endogenously choose not to report to the public data to maintain a greater degree of secrecy. In this case, the results in Table 1 would suggest an important data gap arising from analysis based only on public data: many hedge funds with non-standard or difficult-to-classify strategies may be substantially under-represented.

4.2 Net and Gross Assets by Fund Domicile

Table 2 decomposes net and gross assets by fund domicile. Fund domicile is a standard characteristic funds report to the public databases, because these often associate with considerations relevant to prospective investors (such as tax implications). Form PF does not contain information on fund domicile, but Form ADV does. Based on a mapping of Form PF funds to Form ADV (made possible by the common SEC identifier), we are able to determine fund domiciles for funds reporting to Form PF as well.

The results in Panel A show that Caribbean-domiciled hedge funds have the largest amount of total net assets
missing from the public databases. This fraction of assets in Caribbean-domiciled funds missing from the public data has also grown over time. Roughly 52% of total net assets were missing from the public data in 2013, while over 57% were missing by the end of 2016. Nearly 60% of U.S.-domiciled assets are missing from the public data; this is unsurprising given that the Form PF collection is based on private funds advised by investment advisers that are registered with SEC, and is therefore may be skewed toward U.S.-domiciled funds.

Meanwhile, European-domiciled hedge are dramatically over-represented in the public data. Again, this is unsurprising given that the Form PF data covers only advisers registered with the SEC, a U.S. regulator. However, the difference in European-domiciled assets is suggestive of the potential size of missing assets in large European funds. For funds domiciled in the U.S. in 2016, non-publicly reporting funds have total net assets that are 142% larger than the total net assets in publicly-reporting funds. If we apply the same percentage of “under-reporting” to European-domiciled funds, this would suggest an additional $970 billion in missing net assets. Of course, this number is purely speculative, and it may be that large hedge funds are more likely to domicile in the U.S. or the Caribbean, making this estimate of missing European hedge fund assets an overestimate. Nonetheless, if the pattern of reporting between public and non-public data in the U.S. is informative for European-domiciled funds, our estimates of the total size of the industry are likely to be too small by a significant margin.

The remaining domiciles appear to contain relatively little of the total net and gross assets of the global hedge fund industry (less than 10%). Similar patterns by domicile arise for total gross assets, which are shown in Panel B.

5 Returns

5.1 Gross Returns

*The immediate question might be how so many hedge fund managers failed to do better...A bigger question, however, is why the investment performance of hedge funds has been so poor for so long.*

– Dan Mccrum, Financial Times, January 5th, 2017

*The dramatic underperformance of hedge funds is pretty amazing considering the survivorship and backfill biases in the index data that skew hedge fund returns upwards by 3% to 5% per year.*

– Peter Lazaroff, Enterprising Investor blog at CFAInstitute.org, February 24, 2016

Since the financial crisis, the financial press and industry observers have lamented the relatively poor performance of hedge funds. While the nature of hedge funds (at least in their original conception) presupposes that funds should underperform a broad stock index during bull markets and outperform during bear markets, the degree of
recent under-performance has received scrutiny.

Most hedge fund studies focus on the returns provided to investors, or the alphas that result from the application of asset-pricing models (most notably, the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model of hedge fund returns).\textsuperscript{18} The vast majority of these studies rely solely on return data contained in public hedge fund databases, and industry observers are likewise limited to data available from industry service providers or private (and likely incomplete) collections.\textsuperscript{19}

However, without a comprehensive accounting of fund returns, it is difficult to know the extent to which the performance of funds with publicly available data are representative of the experience of the industry as a whole. Yet, fund performance is an integral part of the potential for systemic risk in hedge funds. Because investor flows (studied in the following section) and the availability of capital have been shown to be sensitive to fund performance, understanding the aggregate performance of hedge funds is crucial for understanding the potential for large scale asset sales and anticipating the future growth of the industry. Further, if well-capitalized funds provide liquidity during periods of stress, then historical returns may proxy for funds ability to absorb underpriced assets.

The top panel of Figure 5 shows the size-weighted (by net asset value) average net-of-fee rate of return earned by funds reporting to at least one of the public databases, and by funds reporting only to Form PF, for the period January 2013 through December 2016. The top panel of Figure 5 is that the returns to the public and private datasets appear to be highly correlated. Indeed, the time-series correlation of the value-weighted return series is 85\% over the sample period. However, while the returns to public and non-public funds move together, the magnitudes appear to differ; the returns to funds in the public databases appear to have larger downsides and smaller upsides than the privately-reporting funds. Small differences in magnitudes in monthly rates of return could produce relatively large differences in total returns.

The bottom panel of Figure 5 plots the growth of one dollar invested at the end of 2012 in the value-weighted portfolios of funds in the public and non-public databases. That is, the bottom panel of Figure 5 reports the cumulative, total return earned by the value-weighted portfolio of public and non-public funds, separately. The results are dramatic. $1 invested in the public funds would be worth just under $1.09 at the end of 2016; the same investment in non-reporting funds would be worth $1.27. Privately reporting funds earned 18 percentage points higher total returns than publicly reporting funds over the four-year sample.

Figure 6 shows that the outperformance of non-publicly reporting funds is consistent across nearly every hedge fund strategy. One dollar invested in the NAV-weighted portfolio of public Equity-style funds would be worth $1.14;
one dollar invested in the portfolio of private Equity-style funds would be worth $1.36, a cumulative performance difference of 22 percentage points. Similar outperformance of the privately-reporting funds is found in Relative Value strategies (9% total return vs. 32%), Credit strategies (5% vs. 20%), Event Driven strategies (19% vs. 42%), Multi-strategy (9% vs. 25%), and Other strategies (10% vs. 21%). The only strategies for which the non-publicly reporting funds did not outperform the publicly-reporting funds are Macro strategies (3% total return for publicly-reporting funds vs. 0% for non-publicly reporting funds), and Managed Futures (9% vs -5%). Although we note that Managed Futures funds in the Form PF data may not be representative due to Commodity Trading Advisers ability to report to the CFTC and not to Form PF. These results are consistent with Barth and Monin (2018), who find substantial alpha using the Form PF data over a similar sample period.

Of course, there may be different reasons why hedge funds choose not to list in public databases, many of which have been previously addressed in the literature, and which would naturally lead to average return differences between the public and non-public datasets. First, as documented by EFH, very large and successful hedge funds — those most likely to possess skill — may be reticent to list in public databases due to the potential for reverse-engineering or otherwise intensified attention to their strategies. Large and successful funds may also be nearing diseconomies-of-scale in the capacity of their investment style. If diseconomies-of-scale bind, we might expect larger, more successful funds to have worse performance than smaller funds who have yet to reach their full investment capacity. Second, unsuccessful hedge funds may strategically choose to not publicize their returns in order to minimize the publicity that their poor performance generates (e.g., through word-of-mouth or through the media) in order to stem outflows from existing investors or to promote inflows from new investors.

These issues, in conjunction with our results, highlight the complex nature of biases in hedge fund returns data. As illustrated by the quote to begin this section, conventional wisdom is that returns to hedge funds in general are likely worse than those reporting publicly due to backfill and survivorship biases. However, while survivorship and backfill bias likely inflate returns relative to an unbiased estimate for the full sample of publicly reporting funds, this upward-biased sample of returns appears to dramatically under-estimate the returns to the industry as a whole. This is because sample selection bias in public data appears to be strongly negative for returns, and much larger than the positive biases associated with publicly-reporting funds. In aggregate, the result is that the hedge fund industry has performed significantly better than would be indicated by the publicly available data, despite the upward-bias associated with publicly-reporting funds in sample.

20The fact that some of the largest hedge funds choose not to list in public databases (EFH) is consistent with their recognition of a diseconomy-of-scale in accepting too much inflows from investors. Berk and Green (2004) show that diseconomies-of-scale may explain the lack of alpha in the mutual fund industry.
We note one final, albeit speculative, observation. The public funds which perform the best relative to the non-public funds are in Macro and Managed Futures strategies. Perhaps coincidentally, Table 1 shows that these are also the strategies with the highest percentage of total net assets being reported to the public data (73% and 88%, respectively, as of the end of 2016). That is, the strategies with the best performance of public compared to non-public funds are the strategies with largest proportion of publicly-reporting funds. This may suggest biases in public hedge fund data originate from the historical experience of funds’ broad investment objectives, rather than from individual fund performance only.

5.2 Alphas

Section 5.1 showed that the gross returns of non-publicly reporting funds were substantially higher than the returns of publicly-reporting funds. Such differences could arise either because non-publicly reporting funds have higher risk-adjusted returns, or because they take greater systematic risk through higher betas (or both). Yet the systemic risk implications of these two scenarios differ considerably. If the larger, non-publicly reporting funds earn higher returns because they have greater exposure to systematic risk factors, such as overall market performance or aggregate liquidity, then larger funds may do exceptionally bad precisely when markets are contracting. This may raise the risk of amplification through fire sales or limit funds ability to provide liquidity. Alternatively, if the outperformance of non-publicly reporting funds is due largely to alpha, then systematic risk in non-publicly reporting funds may be similar to publicly-reporting funds.

To examine the source of the gross return differences between publicly and non-publicly reporting funds, we estimate a distribution of alpha $t$-statistics following the bootstrap procedure outlined in Fama and French (2010). Our goal is to understand whether alphas in publicly-reporting funds are systematically different than alphas in non-publicly reporting funds. Specifically, we first estimate alphas for each fund $i$ in a standard factor-model setting:

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i^t F_t + \epsilon_{i,t},$$

(1)

where $R_{i,t}$ is fund $i$’s return in period $t$, $\alpha_i$ is manager “skill” or the average return not captured by systematic risk, $\beta_i$ is a vector of sensitivities to systematic risk factors, $F_t$ is the time $t$ vector of systematic risk factors, and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is the residual. Our factors $F_t$ come from the “Global 7” factor model developed in Joenvaara, Kauppila, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2019). The Global 7 model has been shown to have greater explanatory power for hedge fund returns than the traditional Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, and has the added benefit of comprising true asset pricing factors (returns to long-short portfolios sorted on characteristics). Instead, the Fung-Hsieh model often used in hedge fund
research includes style portfolios that cannot be interpreted as risk factors. The Global 7 model includes: the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors — the excess market return (Mkt), value (HML), size (SMB), and cross-sectional momentum (CS MOM), the time-series momentum factor (TS MOM) from Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012), the betting against beta factor (BAB) from Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), and the traded liquidity factor (PS LIQ) from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Each of the Global 7 factors have been shown to be important sources of systematic risk in hedge fund portfolios. Nonetheless, all of the results in this section are robust to using the Fung-Hsieh style portfolios.

Next, for each fund $i$, we generate a vector of empirical returns under the counterfactual that $\alpha_i = 0$. That is, we construct $\tilde{R}_{ij} = R_{ij} - \alpha_i$. The set of returns $\tilde{R}_{ij}$ maintain all of the empirical characteristics of the actual realized returns, except for alphas for each fund are zero by construction. Using this zero-alpha empirical distribution of returns, we then bootstrap 10,000 simulated samples of the same size as our empirical data (48 months). In the Fama and French (2010) approach, a simulated sample is generated by randomly sampling dates with replacement. However, hedge fund returns are known to have a strong autocorrelation structures (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)), and sampling dates at random would destroy this structure. Instead, we employ the stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994), which samples an initial date $t = 1$ at random from the empirical data (a date between January 2013 and December 2016). Then, for each remaining data $t = 2, \ldots, T$, we set $s^b_t = 1 + \text{Mod}(s^b_{t-1}, T)$ with probability $1 - \frac{1}{L}$, and sample $s^b_t$ uniformly otherwise. The modulo operator simply imposes that if $t$ equals December 2016, then $t + 1$ is January 2013 in the event that $t + 1$ is not randomly drawn. This ensures that bootstrapped dates are sampled in continuous “blocks” to preserve the autocorrelation structure. Following Ledoit and Wolf (2008), we set $L = 6$ in our analyses.

Finally, for each of the 10,000 bootstrapped (zero-alpha) samples, we re-estimate the factor model specified in equation (1), and calculate the t-statistic of the estimated alpha for each fund, $t(\hat{\alpha}^b_i)$. As in Fama and French (2010), we use the t-statistics of alphas instead of alphas to account for differences in estimation precision that arise from differences in the number of months the fund is observed in the data. This gives us 10,000 cross-sectional samples of alpha $t$-statistics from a sample with alphas equal to zero by construction. This comprises the empirical zero-alpha counterfactual return distribution to which we can compare the actual distribution of hedge fund returns.

The benefit of this bootstrap approach is that it allows for the empirical distributions of publicly and non-publicly reporting funds to differ; that is, we do not have to impose that the only difference in the distributions are due to differences in means. Further, the empirical distributions of fund returns may not be well-approximated by ex-ante specified parametric distributions, and the non-parametric bootstrap approach avoids incorrect inferences that may
result from assumptions about functional forms.

Figure 7 plots the empirical CDFs of alpha $t$-statistics from the actual hedge fund data against the CDFs obtained by taking the average $t$-values across all 10,000 bootstrapped samples at each quantile. The top-left panel plots the simulated and actual CDFs of gross-of-fee alpha $t$-statistics for publicly-reporting funds, while the right-panel plots CDFs for non-publicly reporting funds. Estimated alpha $t$-statistics in publicly reporting funds are on average zero, and the CDFs intersect almost exactly at the 50$^{th}$ percentile. Publicly-reporting funds have slightly larger alphas in the upper end of the distribution, but slightly smaller alphas in the lower end. That is, actual alphas appear to be more fat-tailed compared to the simulated data for publicly-reporting funds.

Conversely, the top-right panel of Figure 7 shows that for non-publicly reporting funds, gross-of-fee alphas are uniformly higher in the actual data than the simulated data. The CDF of the actual return data is always below — and quite substantially in the heart of the distribution — the CDF of the simulated data. This indicates that alphas in non-publicly reporting funds are statistically much larger than those implied by the zero-alpha simulated data throughout the entirety of the distribution.

The bottom row of Figure 7 plots CDFs based on net-of-fee returns. The results are largely unchanged. For publicly-reporting funds, a majority of the actual distribution lies above the simulated distribution, suggesting that funds do slightly worse net-of-fee than would be implied by a zero-alpha (net-of-fee) distribution. For non-publicly reporting funds, the CDF of actual alphas continues to be below the simulated CDF for the entire distribution. This suggests the positive alphas in non-publicly reporting funds are not entirely captured by managers in the form of higher fees (as may be predicted in a Berk and Green (2004) style model, for instance), but instead are partially passed through to fund investors. Barth and Monin (2019) suggest this may be due to investors demanding additional compensation for tighter share restrictions, which managers use to pursue more illiquid strategies with less certain payoff horizons.

Figure 8 shows the same result is evident in the PDFs. Publicly-reporting funds have alpha $t$-statistics centered around zero (or below zero) with fatter tails than the simulated distribution. Non-publicly reporting funds also exhibit a fatter-tailed distribution than the simulated data, but it is centered well to the right of zero. That is, while publicly-reporting funds exhibit no statistically detectable alpha, non-publicly reporting funds show significantly positive estimated alpha.

Table 3 offers an alternative way to view hedge fund alphas. The table shows the average value of alpha $t$-statistics across the 10,000 bootstrapped samples at various quantiles and the value of the alpha $t$-statistics at those quantiles in the actual data. The table also shows the fraction of bootstrapped samples for which the simulated
quantile value is below the actual quantile value, which is equivalent to a $p$-value in a one-sided hypothesis test. This is shown for both gross and net-of-fee returns. The first thing to note is that while alphas differ between publicly and non-publicly reporting funds, the distributions of the zero-alpha samples are highly similar. Between the 10th and 90th percentiles, the quantile values for the publicly and non-publicly reporting funds differ by at most one basis point. The non-publicly reporting funds appear to have slightly fatter tails, but differences in the tails are still quite small. Said differently, apart from differences in means, the empirical distributions of returns for publicly and non-publicly reporting funds appear to be virtually identical. This is true for both net and gross-of-fee returns.

Table 3 also shows how much larger alphas are in non-publicly reporting funds than publicly-reporting funds. For gross-of-fee returns, at the 50th percentile less than 29% of the bootstrapped, zero-alpha samples had average alpha $t$-statistics below the actual median value for publicly-reporting funds. The fraction of bootstrapped samples that are below the actual value for publicly-reporting funds doesn’t surpass 90% until after the 70th percentile. Alternatively, for non-publicly reporting funds, by the 20th percentile more than 97% of bootstrapped samples generate alpha $t$-statistics below the actual observed alpha $t$-statistic, and this percentage remains above 98% for each quantile after. That is, one can reject the null hypothesis that actual alphas in non-publicly reporting funds are equivalent to those in the zero-alpha data at each quantile above the 20th percentile. This once again confirms that alphas in publicly-reporting funds between 2013 and 2016 are statistically no different from zero, while they are substantially higher for non-publicly reporting funds. These key takeaways are true for both gross and net-of-fee returns.

In summary, the results in this section suggest that the outperformance of non-publicly reporting funds documented in section 5.1 are largely driven by alpha. The empirical distributions of the simulated, zero-alpha returns are highly similar for publicly and non-publicly reporting funds, suggesting that risk exposures and other high-order moments are also similar. However, alphas in non-publicly reporting funds are dramatically higher, indicating that the distribution of non-publicly reporting funds’ returns is simply a rightward shift of the publicly-reporting distribution.

## 6 Flows

The larger growth of assets under management in non-publicly reporting funds, demonstrated in Figures 1 and 3, could result from higher returns or higher net inflows of investor capital. Figures 5 and 6 show that non-publicly reporting funds have indeed outperformed funds in the public databases. In this section, we examine whether flows to non-publicly reporting funds have also been higher.

Several hedge fund studies examine the relationship between investor flows and past performance.\(^{21}\) These past

\(^{21}\)See Christoffersen, Musto, and Wermers (2014), for a survey of studies of the flow-performance relation.
studies seek to determine whether hedge fund investors infer the quality of a hedge fund from its past performance record. However, the selection bias that we have demonstrated in the public data brings into question whether these past studies are similarly biased in their inference of the flow-performance relation. The findings in this section therefore also provide some preliminary evidence on potential biases in studies that use only public data.

A prediction of how the selection bias of listing in the public data affects the flow-performance relation is complicated by two competing affects. First, listing in the public database may draw attention to the past performance of a hedge fund, and may result in an exaggerated response of investor flows to the observed past performance. Second, performance in a non-public fund may be more indicative of manager skill, especially if funds strategically list in the public database when their past returns have been good. Which of these two effects will dominate is an empirical question.

Due to the delisting issues associated with hedge fund data — listing and delisting that arises from strategic and voluntary reporting in public databases, and with size-based reporting thresholds in regulatory data — calculating net investor flows is not a trivial task. Further, neither the public databases nor Form PF collect data on subscriptions and redemptions explicitly, which means flows must be approximated from net assets and fund returns. One approach would be to calculate the total net assets in the public and non-public funds in quarter \( t \) and \( t - 1 \), and use the NAV-weighted average returns to each to infer the net flows in quarter \( t \). However, this method will conflate the net flows to funds that report to a database (or Form PF) in both \( t \) and \( t - 1 \), the increase in net assets due to newly reporting funds that did not report in \( t - 1 \), and the decrease in net assets due to funds that report in \( t - 1 \) but exit the data prior to reporting assets in period \( t \). For this reason, it is also not possible to calculate credible flow estimates based on aggregated asset and performance data, either by public versus non-public reporting or by fund strategy.

Instead, our approach is to calculate flows for each fund each that reports in both quarters \( t - 1 \) and \( t \), and then to calculate average flows by value-weighting individual fund flows by net assets in \( t - 1 \):

\[
Flow_{i,t} = \frac{NAV_{i,t} - NAV_{i,t-1}(1 + r_{i,t})}{NAV_{i,t-1}} \quad (2)
\]

\[
Flow_t = \sum_i \frac{NAV_{i,t-1}}{NAV_{i,t-1}} \times Flow_{i,t}, \quad NAV_{t-1} = \sum_i NAV_{i,t-1} \quad (3)
\]

For each fund \( i \) we calculate quarterly flows, \( Flow_{i,t} \), using the standard approach in the literature, which subtracts net assets in period \( t - 1 \), multiplied by the fund’s quarterly return, from net assets in period \( t \) and scaled by net assets in \( t - 1 \). Aggregate flows, \( Flow_t \), are then simply the NAV-weighted average of individual fund flows (weighted by NAV in quarter \( t - 1 \)). Similarly to returns, we calculate total flows, \( Flow_t \), separately for public versus non-public
funds as well as for strategy.

It is important to interpret $Flow_t$ appropriately; it is the weighted-average flows of funds that appear in the data in both $t-1$ and $t$. To the extent that such funds are representative of the hedge fund industry in aggregate, then the flow results documented here will be a good approximation of total industry flows. However, if this is not the case, then aggregate industry flows may differ from the flows documented below.

The top-panel of Figure 9 shows the value-weighted, quarterly flows for funds that report to one of the public databases and for funds that report to Form PF but not to any public database. The empirical patterns differ substantially from the return results show in Figure 5; in all but one quarter, the average flows to publicly reporting funds exceed those to non-publicly reporting funds. Further, for non-publicly reporting funds, flows are negative in most quarters, whereas they are positive in most quarters for publicly reporting funds. The bottom panel of Figure 9 shows the effect such quarterly differences has on cumulative flows over the entire sample period. Public funds have experienced an almost 10% total net inflow over the period 2013-2016, while non-publicly reporting funds have experienced a nearly -15% cumulative net outflow.

Figure 10 shows that, similar to the return results reported earlier, the flow results are largely consistent across fund strategy. Within every strategy, the publicly reporting funds experienced greater cumulative net flows than non-publicly reporting funds. For many strategies, the size of these cumulative flow differences are substantial. Publicly-reporting Equity funds had a total cumulative flow of 17% versus -3% for non-publicly reporting funds. Similar disparities exist for Relative Value funds (-11% versus -21%), Credit funds (15% versus -19%), Event Driven funds (-7% versus -23%), Multi-strategy funds (35% versus -15%), and Other strategy funds (55% versus -28%). Publicly-reporting Macro and Managed Futures funds also had higher total cumulative flows, but the differences are much smaller.

The results in Figures 9 and 10 are not necessarily surprising. Funds that report to public databases likely do so to increase investor awareness and raise additional capital, and one would expect such funds to have greater net flows than funds that are not actively marketing to new prospective investors. Further, if the larger, non-publicly reporting funds are more likely to have reached economies-of-scale, and are therefore no longer open to new investment, the patterns in Figure 9 would also be expected. However, the flows results offer an interesting contrast with the return results; while the publicly reporting funds perform considerably worse than than the non-publicly reporting funds, they nonetheless have raised substantially more capital as a fraction of net assets than their better-performing non-public counterparts.

The combination of results in Sections 5.1 and 6 has important implications for the estimated flow-performance
relationship in hedge funds. Funds reporting to the public data simultaneously exhibit (i) poorer performance, and (ii) greater net flows. While the flow-performance relationship is ultimately about a slope, rather than a level, and without fully merging the public and non-public data it is impossible to sign the bias, the results from the non-public data may suggest that the true flow-performance relationship is significantly flatter than that implied by only the public data.

7 Conclusions

We use data from a merged set of seven public hedge fund data vendors, in combination with regulatory filings from the first systematic U.S. regulatory collection of data on large hedge funds, to form the most comprehensive estimate of the size of the global hedge fund industry to date. We estimate worldwide net assets under management of $5.2 trillion, and gross assets under management of $8.5-8.7 trillion, both of which are roughly 40% greater than the largest prevailing estimates. These findings indicate a much bigger “footprint” of hedge funds in financial markets than previously believed, and highlight the importance of regulatory data collections for filling data gaps and assessing the potential systemic risks associated with hedge fund activities.

Our larger estimates arise because neither the public data vendors nor regulators have a comprehensive view of total industry assets. Public data services collect information only on a voluntary basis, and regulatory data is only collected for funds within the appropriate jurisdictions. Further, due to yet unresolved data gaps, our results likely still represent an underestimate of the total industry size; our combined data may miss many large funds that neither report to public databases nor have any U.S. investors. While U.S. regulators have no direct oversight over private funds with no U.S. investors, such funds may nonetheless be significant participants in U.S. financial markets or have relationships with U.S. counterparties. Our estimates of the size of missing non-U.S. fund assets should therefore be of interest to U.S. regulators with little visibility into such funds.

We then decompose hedge fund assets by broad strategy and fund domicile, and find that the AUM of all strategies are significantly understated by publicly available data. Many, including Equity, Event Driven, Relative Value, Multi-strategy, and Other, have less than 50% of assets accounted for by the public data. The Other strategy is particularly poorly represented; this may reflect the noisiness of strategy classifications in the regulatory data, or may reflect that funds with unique and idiosyncratic strategies may be particularly unlikely to report to any public data source. Additionally, a breakdown of assets by fund domicile suggests the “missing” assets in large European funds is likely substantial, highlighting that our much larger estimates of the size of the industry are almost surely still an underestimate.
Next, we explore the difference in the average returns between funds that report to at least one public data vendor and those that report only on regulatory filings. This analysis is motivated in part by the well-documented under-performance of hedge funds in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our findings suggest that non-publicly reporting funds dramatically outperform those that report to the public databases, both in aggregate and within nearly every fund strategy category. This relatively poor performance of publicly-reporting funds could, in part, motivate the recent criticism of hedge fund returns by industry observers and the financial press. Further, we find that this outperformance is driven almost exclusively by larger alphas, rather than greater exposures to systematic risk factors.

Finally, given the vast literature on the hedge fund and mutual fund flow-performance relation, we estimate the average flows (as a percentage of AUM) from investors to hedge funds in the public and non-public data. A priori, it is not clear whether hedge funds that choose to list in public datasets should have a greater ability to gather assets (due to the increased publicity) or a lesser ability (due to the worse performance documented in this paper). We find that the average net flow is significantly higher for publicly-reporting funds compared to non-publicly reporting funds, despite having significantly worse performance.

Our results demonstrate a multitude of potential biases associated public hedge fund data. First, the net assets of funds that report publicly has grown by 19% over the period 2013-2016; the growth of assets for non-publicly reporting funds is nearly 50% for this same period. Second, conventional wisdom suggests that the performance of publicly-reporting funds is likely to overestimate the true performance of the industry, due to backfill and survivorship biases. We find that (negative) selection bias dominates these effects, so that performance estimates based on publicly-reporting funds are instead biased significantly downward. Third, the combination of better performance and lower net flows associated with non-public funds suggests the true flow-performance relationship is likely much flatter than that estimated from public data alone. While our results are limited by the data available in both public data and Form PF, they suggest that both are likely to be biased in significant ways.
References


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8 Tables and Figures

8.1 Tables
Table 1: Industry Size by Strategy

### PANEL A: NET ASSETS ($ Billions)

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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>654</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macro</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>654</td>
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<tr>
<td>Event Driven</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Value</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managed Futures</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>2,343</td>
<td>4,527</td>
<td>2,409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PANEL B: GROSS ASSETS ($ Billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Public</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Non-Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>2,176</td>
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<td>Multi-strategy</td>
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<td>510</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>787</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>854</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macro</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>337</td>
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<tr>
<td>Event Driven</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>515</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative Value</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>228</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managed Futures</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 reports total net and gross assets for publicly-reporting and non-publicly reporting funds in aggregate and by strategy. Strategy categories are determined by Form PF.
### Table 2: Industry Size by Geographic Region

#### PANEL A: NET ASSETS ($ Billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Public</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Non-Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>1,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>2,343</td>
<td>4,527</td>
<td>2,409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Panel B: GROSS ASSETS ($ Billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Public</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Non-Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1,869</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>3,767</td>
<td>2,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>1,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,445</td>
<td>3,886</td>
<td>7,331</td>
<td>3,804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 reports total net and gross assets for publicly-reporting and non-publicly reporting funds in aggregate and by fund domicile. For non-publicly reporting funds, domicile is determined from Form ADV.
Table 3: Distribution of Alphas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pct</th>
<th>Gross of Fee Returns</th>
<th>Net of Fee Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publicly Reporting</td>
<td>Non-Publicly Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sim</td>
<td>Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2.63</td>
<td>-3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2.02</td>
<td>-2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1.86</td>
<td>-2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-1.73</td>
<td>-2.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
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<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>2.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>1.71</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>3.41</td>
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<td>97</td>
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<td>3.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>6.13</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 3 shows various percentile values for alpha $t$-statistics from the actual data, and the values calculated by averaging (at each percentile) across the 10,000 bootstrapped samples. Pct is the percentile, Sim is average alpha $t$-statistic at that percentile across the 10,000 bootstrapped samples, Act is the alpha $t$-statistic value in the actual data at that percentile, and % < Act is the percentage of the 10,000 bootstrapped samples that have alpha $t$-statistics that are lower than the actual alpha $t$-statistic at that percentile. Values are shown for gross-of-fee and net-of-fee returns, and for publicly and non-publicly reporting funds.
8.2 Figures

Figure 1: Hedge Fund Industry Net Assets

Figure 1 plots net assets for publicly-reporting and non-publicly reporting funds, separately, as well as their total.
Figure 2 plots net and gross assets for funds that report to at least one public database but do not register with SEC as an investment adviser. Such funds do not report on Form PF or Form ADV.
Figure 3 plots gross assets for publicly-reporting and non-publicly reporting funds, separately, as well as their total.
Figure 4 plots gross assets for publicly-reporting and non-publicly reporting funds, separately, as well as their total. In this figure, gross assets include gross assets as reported on Form PF as well as reported on Form ADV, for funds that do not report gross assets to Form PF or any public database.
The top-panel of Figure 5 plots the monthly, weighted-average rate of return, net of fees, for funds that report to at least one public database and those that report only on Form PF. Returns are value-weighted by funds’ net assets. The bottom-panel plots the cumulative, total return over the full sample period for public and non-public funds, separately, based on the rate of return values reported in the top-panel.
Figure 6 plots the monthly, weighted-average, cumulative total return over the full sample period for public and non-public funds, separately for each strategy category. Rates of return are weighted by funds’ net assets within public/non-public, strategy, month and year.
Figure 7 plots the empirical CDFs of alpha $t$-statistics from the actual data against the CDFs implied by the average values of alpha $t$-statistics at each quantile over the 10,000 bootstrapped samples. For data using Form PF, the empirical CDF is plotted by linearly interpolating between each of the 99 integer-valued percentiles of the distribution of the alphas. All plots include data from January 2013 – December 2016.
Figure 8 plots the empirical PDFs of alpha $t$-statistics from the actual data against the PDFs implied by the average values of alpha $t$-statistics at each quantile over the 10,000 bootstrapped samples. PDFs are calculated using kernel density estimation. For data using Form PF, the kernel density estimation is based on the 99 integer-valued percentiles of the distribution of the alphas. All plots include data from January 2013 – December 2016.
The top-panel of Figure 9 plots the monthly, weighted-average (net) investor flows for funds that report to at least one public database and those that report only on Form PF. Net flows are value-weighted by funds’ net assets. The bottom-panel plots the cumulative, total flow over the full sample period for public and non-public funds, separately, based on the net flows reported in the top-panel.
Figure 10 plots the monthly, weighted-average, cumulative total (net) investor flows over the full sample period for public and non-public funds, separately for each strategy category. Net flows are weighted by funds’ net assets within public/non-public, strategy, month and year.