Competitive Pay and Excessive Manager Risk-taking

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Competitive Pay and Excessive Manager Risk-taking

Jen-Wen Chang* and Simpson Zhang†

Abstract

Since the 2007-09 financial crisis, researchers have debated whether compensation plans drove excessive risk-taking or financial managers simply underestimated the risks of various investments. Through a principal-agent model with heterogeneous beliefs, we show that principals offer contracts that incentivize safe behavior when competition for managerial talent is low. However, intense competition results in contracts that incentivize risk-taking. We find that factors that increase the intensity of competition include greater search efficiency, larger project scales, and higher debt funding, all of which may be prevalent during a financial bubble.

JEL Codes: D86, G38, M12

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1 Introduction

The history of financial crises, including the recent subprime loan crisis, is a history of bubbles bursting: a rise in financial valuations, fueled by overly-optimistic beliefs and misguided

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investments by financial firms, collapses suddenly and drastically. Why is this pattern so persistent? And why don’t financial firms more actively rein in potentially harmful investments by their managers? These questions are critical and timely as financial regulators work to implement reforms, including stronger corporate governance models, that promote better financial manager incentives. Former Federal Reserve Board governor Daniel Tarullo and chairman Jerome Powell have discussed in public speeches the importance of improvements in compensation practices.¹

Our paper helps explain why compensation contracts with the “wrong” incentives are so prevalent during bubbles.² We consider a model in which two principals compete for the managerial talents of an agent who must choose between a safe and a risky action. The principals consider the safe action better than the risky action, but the agent is overly-optimistic and overvalues the risky action.³ We solve for the Nash equilibrium of our model, in which neither principal has an incentive to change their offer given the offer of the other principal. More intense labor market competition shifts the bargaining power to the agent in equilibrium, resulting in contracts that incentivize risk-taking. We identify three specific factors that intensify competition and result in riskier contracts: higher job matching efficiency, larger project investments, and greater debt levels.

Our results show that risky actions can result from competitive forces even when firms prefer safer investments. Thus in seeking reforms, policymakers should carefully consider the impact of their policies on the competition for financial managers.

Prior empirical research has highlighted the elevated competition for managers that occurs during major financial bubbles. Philippon and Reshef (2012) shows that the excess wage

²There have since been calls for stronger incentives in contracts. See https://bankunderground.co.uk/2017/04/05/guest-post-why-regulators-should-focus-on-bankers-incentives/ for instance.
³Baron and Xiong (2017) finds that conditional on bank credit expansion (which increases risk exposure), the predicted excess return for the bank equity index is almost forty percent lower. This provides evidence that bankers optimistically think that the returns of risky actions are higher than in reality.
(wage controlling for education) received by the U.S. financial industry relative to other industries varies considerably over time, and skyrocketed prior to the Great Depression and the 2007-09 financial crisis. The authors attribute this increase in excess wage to greater rents accrued by this sector, which is evidence greater competition for financial managers during these two time periods. In addition, the authors show that excess compensation for financial executives in particular underwent a tremendous increase prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis. Boustanifar et al. (2017) performs a related analysis on a larger group of 15 countries and finds that wages in the financial industry increased on average relative to wages in other industries prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis.

A key part of our model is the presence of overly-optimistic manager beliefs. Overoptimism is a common psychological phenomenon, and its prevalence during financial bubbles has been extensively documented, most famously with the phrase “irrational exuberance”. Before the 2007-09 crisis, financial managers commonly used flawed pricing models, such as Gaussian copula models, which did not accurately model correlations among asset prices. This caused many managers to believe that products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) were much safer than in reality. These models remained popular in spite of repeated warnings from technical experts that they were unsuitable for use in risk management.4 As empirical evidence of optimistic beliefs by investors, Cheng et al. (2014) shows that securitization investors increased their personal housing exposures pre-crisis and their housing portfolios performed worse than those of control groups.

Subprime lending before the crisis also dramatically highlights how financial firms did not prevent overly optimistic financial managers from making damaging investments. Prior to the crisis, the subprime mortgage market substantially increased in lending to borrowers across the credit spectrum,5 including those with poor credit and low probability of repayment. Particularly egregious examples included so-called NINJA loans, made to individuals with “No Income, No Job, No Assets.”6 These loans were justified on the basis of optimistic

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4See https://www.wired.com/2009/02/wp-quant/?currentPage=all
5See Adelino et al. (2016) for an empirical analysis.
6See, for instance, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/2785403/Ninja-loans-explode-on-sub-
beliefs about sustained growth in housing prices.\textsuperscript{7} When housing prices tumbled, the loans collapsed.

Our paper helps explain these events by presenting a non-preference-based reason for why compensation contracts promote excessive risk-taking: market competition. When labor-market competition is intense, such as during financial bubbles, our model predicts that compensation contracts will incentivize more risk-taking. In particular, we show that agent overoptimism alone is not sufficient and that principal overoptimism is not necessary for such contracts to emerge. This result complements the findings of empirical papers like Baron and Xiong (2017) which consider principal overoptimism in explaining credit expansions.

**Outline of the Paper** Section 2 describes the model. A risk-neutral principal wants to hire a risk-neutral agent to make an investment, which can be either safe or risky, by offering a contract with bilateral limited liability.\textsuperscript{8} The returns from this investment are stochastic and depend on the action taken. The principal thinks the safe action has a higher expected payoff but the agent, who is overly-optimistic, thinks the risky action has a higher expected payoff. In the base model, actions are assumed to be contractable. The agent has a reservation utility, which we first assume is exogenous and we then endogenize by embedding the baseline model into a competing principals framework. To model competition, we consider a class of matching processes parameterized by a matching efficiency, which affects the intensity of competition in the labor market.

In Section 3, we solve the model. Why would the principal ever want to implement the risky action? The trade-off is that, by implementing the risky action, the principal can write a contract that pays the agent less than what the agent expects. Exploiting the agent’s heterogeneous beliefs is profitable for the principal when the agent’s reservation utility is high. In the competing principals framework, we show that higher matching efficiencies lead to higher equilibrium utility levels for the agent. For this reason, the risky action will be implemented in equilibrium if the matching efficiency is high.

\textsuperscript{7}Foote et al. (2012) provides evidence for this behavior.
\textsuperscript{8}Our use of bilateral limited liability is similar to Innes (1990).
In Section 4, we discuss two extensions of the model. First, we show that increases in
the fund scale can cause equilibrium actions to become risky. A larger fund scale means
a successful hire is more profitable for the principals, which intensifies the competition for
managerial talents. Environments in which investments are large, such as financial bubbles,
will thus feature contracts that promote excessive risk-taking. Second, we show that loosening
the limited liability constraints and letting the principal take debts allows the principal to
more profitably exploit the agent’s optimistic beliefs. These higher profits can also increase
competition and lead to more risk-taking in equilibrium. Greater firm leverage levels are
thus another reason contracts may incentivize risky actions.

In Section 5, we discuss the implications of hidden actions for our results. We show
that when a principal cannot contract on the agent’s action, profitability decreases and
the safe action may no longer be implementable at high utility values. However, hidden
actions can also reduce the level of competition between principals. The equilibrium effect
of hidden actions can thus be beneficial, and safe actions may be sustainable for a wider
range of matching efficiencies than before. Our result indicates that corporate governance
policies that mandate greater manager oversight need to carefully consider their effect on
labor market competition and the resulting equilibrium implications.

Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. Longer proofs are contained in the appendix.

The Literature Our paper builds on and bridges together several disparate strands of
the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on incentives for bank chief executive of-
ficers (CEOs). There is currently a great debate over the role compensation contracts played
in the financial crisis. One side argues that compensation contracts created poorly aligned
incentives that encouraged excessive risk-taking and contributed to the crisis (Bebchuk and
Spamann (2010), Bebchuk and Fried (2009)). The other side (Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011))
asserts that contracts did provide proper incentives as many CEOs had a large amount of
their equity at stake. Under the second view, behavioral reasons provide a possible explana-

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9For a recent survey of this vast literature, see Edmans and Gabaix (2016).
10For example, the contract is chosen to maximize CEO rents instead of shareholder value.
tion for the bad investments. Our work connects these two views: heterogeneous beliefs and labor market competition work jointly to cause firms to offer compensation contracts that incentivize suboptimal decisions.

Our paper also contributes to the study of labor market competition in agency models. Bénabou and Tirole (2016) features a model in which the agent exerts effort on a non-contractable and a contractable task, with output from the latter being talent-dependent. Competition causes firms to offer higher incentives and bonuses to screen for talent, thereby driving the incentives for the contractable task from downward distorted to upward distorted relative to the optimum. In our paper, heterogeneous beliefs instead of screening motives are the main consideration in the principal’s contracting problem. Competition results in riskier actions that actually reduce manager compensation *ex post* due to the manager’s overly-optimistic beliefs about the contract’s payoff. This result is in line with the empirical findings of Otto (2014), which shows that optimistic managers receive less total compensation and fewer bonuses than peers. Bijlsma et al. (2012) also considers a model with moral hazard and adverse selection. In Acharya et al. (2016), the ability of an agent is gradually revealed if the agent stays in the same firm long enough. Competition is captured by labor mobility, and mobility offers the low talent agent a way to delay being discovered as low by moving to other firms. Most closely related in spirit to our paper is Thanassoulis (2013). In his model, the optimal contract mitigates the impatient agent’s short-termism induced moral hazard by delaying bonuses. With competition, firms offer more short-term bonuses, increasing the agents’ short-termism. Our paper considers both a different source of disagreement, caused by heterogeneous beliefs, and a different model of competition that incorporates matching frictions. We show that higher matching efficiencies lead to more risk-taking. Crucially, in our model with competition, moral hazard can actually limit the amount of risk-taking in equilibrium.

Our paper is also related to optimal contract design with heterogeneous beliefs. Gervais et al. (2011) analyzes contract design with an agent who is both risk-averse and overcon-
Risk-aversion may limit the agent from taking the amount of risk the principal desires. The optimal contract is able to take advantage of the agent’s overconfidence and still implement the principal-preferred action. Bolton et al. (2006) find that when the principal thinks the market is speculative, the optimal incentive contract directs the manager to spend more effort on castle-in-the-air projects because of the arbitrage opportunity. Goel and Thakor (2008) shows that the CEO selection process tends to favor overconfident agents to become CEOs. Palomino and Sadrieh (2011) considers a model with information acquisition and analyzes how overconfidence shapes the optimal contract. Wang et al. (2013) considers a similar model with optimism instead of overconfidence. De la Rosa (2011) studies optimal contract design when the principal and the agent have heterogeneous beliefs about how effort affects project success. Sautmann et al. (2013) provides experimental evidence in a similar environment that principals take advantage of agents’ overconfidence.

Most of these contract design papers assume that the principal prefers riskier actions than the agent. Under such conditions, the prevalence of risky actions in equilibrium may not seem surprising. Instead, we use the competition for managerial talents to explain the prevalence of contracts that promote risk-taking even when the principal doesn’t want the agent to take the risky action in the first place. Our model thus shows that even under the most conservative set of assumptions, the forces of competition can still cause excessive risk-taking.

Finally, our paper also has implications for the leverage cycle. Geanakoplos (2010) argues that the leverage cycle is driven by optimistic or pessimistic beliefs due to the occurrence of good or bad news. Our model suggests that competition for managers, which is high in boom times and low in bad times, amplifies the leverage cycle.

\footnote{Overconfidence is typically modeled as the agent having a higher subjective signal precision than in reality regarding a risky investment. Overoptimism, on the other hand, is having a higher subjective probabilistic belief that good outcomes occur. In the appendix we show that our model can also be formulated in terms of overconfidence.}
2 The Model

Players There is a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent. The principal (she) hires an agent (he) to manage an investment.

Actions A hired agent takes an action $a \in \{s, r\}$, where $s$ is the safe action and $r$ is the risky venture.

Beliefs The principal thinks that investment payoffs have densities $f(x|a)$, $a \in \{s, r\}$. The agent agrees that the safe investment generates payoffs according to $f(x|s)$, but believes that the risky venture generates payoffs according to density $f_A(x|r)$ instead. Densities are continuously differentiable and everywhere positive. Most importantly, we assume that

$$E[x|r] < E[x|s] < E_A[x|r].$$

We interpret the safe action as representing the common and well-known action, so the two parties have no disagreement over its payoff. The risky action on the other hand represents the newer or more complex investment. Although possible, we do not require the payoff from the risky action to have a higher variance than that of the safe action. Instead, “riskiness” in our model is broadly interpreted as meaning harder to understand due to its novelty or complexity. For instance prior to the financial crisis, although many CDOs were highly rated, their inherent complexity made them difficult to value correctly, and their use could thus be considered risky.

Contract A contract is a pair $(w, a)$ where $w : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is a measurable function satisfying bilateral limited liability: $0 \leq w(x) \leq x$, and $a \in \{r, s\}$.

We call a contract a safe contract if $a = s$ and a risky contract if $a = r$.

Utilities Suppose the contract $(w, a)$ is offered, accepted, and action $a$ is taken. The principal’s expected utility is

$$\Pi_a = E[x - w(x)|a].$$

\textsuperscript{12}Bilateral limited liability guarantees that a solution exists when both sides are risk-neutral. We relax this condition in Section 5.
The agent’s expected utility from accepting the contract is

\[ E_A[w(x)|a], \]

where \( E_A[w(x)|s] = E[w(x)|s] \).

The optimal profit from implementing action \( a \) when the agent’s reservation utility is \( u \) is

\[ \Pi_a(u) = \max_{w(\cdot)} E[x - w(x)|a] \tag{1} \]

where \( w(\cdot) \) is measurable, \( 0 \leq w(x) \leq x \), and \( E_A[w(x)|a] \geq u \).

**Competing Principals and the Matching Function** The above baseline model can be embedded into a competing principals framework as follows:

Two principals, \( i = 1, 2 \), compete for one agent by offering contracts \((w_1, a_1), (w_2, a_2)\). Let \( u_1 = E_A[w_1|a_1], u_2 = E_A[w_2|a_2] \) be the utility that the agent receives from each contract. The probability that principal \( i \) is matched with an agent depends on a matching function \( p : [0, \infty)^3 \rightarrow (0, 1] \) with matching efficiency parameter \( \beta \) such that \( p \in C^2 \) and it satisfies:

**Assumption 1.**

1. \( p(u_1, u_2; \beta) + p(u_2, u_1; \beta) = 1 \).

2. \( p_1 \geq 0, p_3 > 0 \) when \( u_1 > u_2 \),

3. \( \partial \ln p / \partial u_1 \) is decreasing in \( u_1 \), \( \partial \ln p / \partial u_2 \) is increasing in \( u_1 \). Furthermore, \( p_1/p = 0 \) when \( \beta = 0 \), is increasing in \( \beta \) when \( u_1 \leq u_2 \), and along \( u_1 = u_2 = u \), \( p_1/p \) is non-increasing in \( u \) and increases from zero to infinity when \( \beta \) goes from zero to infinity.

Item 1 reflects that principals are competing for an agent. Item 2 says that the matching probability is increasing in own offering and increasing in the matching efficiency when own offering is higher. Note that 1. and 2. imply that \( p_2 \leq 0, p_3 < 0 \) when \( u_1 < u_2 \), and \( p_3 = 0 \) when \( u_1 = u_2 \).

Item 3 says that the marginal effect of own offering on matching probability does not increase too much when own offering increases, does not decrease too much when other's
offering increases, and the own offering elasticity, when evaluated at \( u_1 = u_2 = u \), does not increase too fast in \( u \), and spans the entire positive reals when the matching efficiency parameter \( \beta \) varies across the positive reals.

Our assumptions on the matching problem represent a natural set of restrictions. They mainly entail that the matching function shows decreasing returns to scale from offering higher levels of utility.

We give an example of a matching process that satisfies our assumptions.

**Example 2.1 (Normal Noise on Wage Offered).** Let \( \{\epsilon_i\} \) be i.i.d. random variables distributed as \( N(0, \frac{1}{2\beta}) \). Suppose principal \( i \) offers a contract with indirect utility \( u_i \) to some type of agent. Then the contract generates a signal \( s_i = u_i + \epsilon_i \). Agents are matched to the principal with the highest realized signal.

Hence, given \( u_1, u_2 \),

\[
p(u_1, u_2; \beta) = 1 - \Phi(\sqrt{\beta}(u_2 - u_1))
\]

and

\[
\frac{p_1(u_1, u_2; \beta)}{p(u_1, u_2; \beta)} = \frac{\sqrt{\beta} \phi(\sqrt{\beta}(u_2 - u_1))}{1 - \Phi(\sqrt{\beta}(u_2 - u_1))}
\]

\[
\frac{p_2(u_1, u_2; \beta)}{p(u_1, u_2; \beta)} = -\sqrt{\beta} \phi(\sqrt{\beta}(u_2 - u_1))
\]

\[
\frac{p_3(u_1, u_2; \beta)}{p(u_1, u_2; \beta)} = \frac{(u_2 - u_1) \phi(\sqrt{\beta}(u_2 - u_1))}{2\sqrt{\beta}(1 - \Phi(\sqrt{\beta}(u_2 - u_1)))}
\]

which indeed satisfies our assumptions on the matching function.

**Equilibrium** Our equilibrium notion is pure-strategy Nash equilibrium:

**Definition 2.1.** For a given \( \beta \), a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a pair of contracts \((w_1, a_1), (w_2, a_2)\) such that \( E_A[w_i|a_i] = u_i \) and \((w_i, a_i)\) solves

\[
\max_{(w', a')} p(u', u_{-i}; \beta) \Pi_{a'}(u')
\]

s.t.

\[
E_A[w'|a'] = u'.
\]
We will focus on symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the analysis (equilibria in which principals implement the same action \(a\) with the same expected wage \(E_A[w|a]\)), and we show in Appendix B that asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria do not exist. A symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is called a safe equilibrium if \(a = s\), and a risky equilibrium if \(a = r\).

3 Contracts and Competition

In this section, we characterize the optimal contract when there is a single principal and we then extend the model to one with competing principals and characterize the Nash equilibrium.

3.1 Optimal Contracts with Single Principal

When there is a single principal, we assume that the agent accepts a contract if, and only if, the contract offers equal or higher utility than his reservation utility.

It is easily seen that to implement the safe action

\[
\Pi_s(u) = E[x|s] - u
\]

and any wage scheme such that \(E[w(x)|s] = u\) is optimal. Because there is no disagreement over the safe action, the principal can simply offer any wage scheme such that the agent’s outside option binds.

The optimal risky action contract is more complex. Because the principal and the agent have heterogeneous beliefs on the risky action’s payoff, the principal should offer a contract that pays off in regions where the agent’s belief is high but the principal’s belief is low. Such a contract will minimize the costs of providing utility to the agent. In fact, it turns out that the optimal contract pays the agent \(x\) whenever \(\lambda f_A(x|r) > f(x|r)\), where \(\lambda\) is the Lagrange multiplier. We provide a full characterization in Appendix A.1.
We note that $\Pi_s(E[x|s]) = 0 < \Pi_r(E[x|s])$ because $E_A[x|r] > E[x|s]$ implies that when implementing the risky action, the principal need not give the agent the entire project to satisfy his reservation of $u = E[x|s]$. Therefore, at sufficiently high reservation utilities offering the risky action is the only way for the principal to earn positive profits.

The main driving force of our model is the following result which shows that there is a cutoff below which the safe action is preferable and above which the risky action is preferable:

**Proposition 3.1.** $\Pi_r(u)$ is decreasing and weakly concave. In particular, there exists $u^* < E[x|s]$ such that $\Pi_s(u) > \Pi_r(u)$ if $u < u^*$ and $\Pi_s(u) < \Pi_r(u)$ if $u > u^*$.

This result has a strong intuition: while the principal perceives the safe action to be the superior one, if it is relatively too costly to hire the agent to do so, the principal would rather implement the risky action to take advantage of the agent’s “wrong” belief. The more competitive the labor market, the higher the wages, and thus the more risky actions will be taken due to the need to match the competition.

To see why $\Pi_r$ is concave, let $w_i$ be the optimal wage scheme implementing $a = r$ when the agent’s reservation utility is $u_i$, $i = 1, 2$. Then for any $u = \rho w_1 + (1 - \rho) w_2$, $\rho \in (0, 1)$, by linearity of the agent’s payoff function the wage scheme $\rho w_1 + (1 - \rho) w_2$ gives the agent utility $u$. However, it may not be principal-optimal. Therefore $\Pi_r(u) \geq \rho \Pi_r(u_1) + (1 - \rho) \Pi_r(u_2)$. Since $\Pi_r(0) < \Pi_s(0)$ and $\Pi_r(E[x|s]) > \Pi_s(E[x|s]) = 0$, $\Pi_r$ crosses $\Pi_s$ exactly once, from below. **Figure 1** plots the optimal profit for implementing the safe action (the blue line) and for implementing the risky action (the red curve) for different reservation utilities.\(^{13}\)

### 3.2 Competition

In this subsection, we characterize the pure strategy Nash equilibria in a competitive labor market. The competition among principals is parameterized by an exogenous matching efficiency $\beta$. We show that as $\beta$ goes up principals compete more fiercely in wages by giving

\[^{13}\]The beliefs used in the example are: $f(x|s) = 1, f_A(x|r) = 2x, f(x|r) = .5x^{-5}$. They satisfy MLRP dominance and therefore also satisfy expected value dominance.
the agent better wage contracts. As a result of Proposition 3.1, the equilibrium contract will thus be risky if the matching efficiency is sufficiently high. We focus on symmetric equilibria and show in Appendix B that asymmetric equilibria do not exist.

For each $a \in \{s, r\}$, the function $p(u_i, u_{-i}; \beta)\Pi_a(u_i)$ defines an auxiliary normal form game in which principals compete in utility levels but are restricted to action $a$. Observe that the utility offered to the agent by any equilibrium $(w, a)$ in the competing principals game, $E_A[w(x)|a]$, must also be an equilibrium of the corresponding auxiliary game for action $a$.

In the auxiliary game, the best-response of principal $i$ to any $u_{-i}$ satisfies the First Order Condition (FOC)

$$p_1(u_i, u_{-i}; \beta)\Pi_a(u_i) + p(u_i, u_{-i}; \beta)\Pi'_a(u_i) = 0.$$ 

Since $p$ is assumed to be log-concave in $u_i$, the symmetric interior Nash equilibrium is therefore
characterized by

\[
p_1(u, u; \beta) \frac{p(u, u; \beta)}{p(u, u; \beta')} = -\Pi_s'(u) \frac{\Pi(a(u))}{\Pi'(a(u))}.
\] (2)

The left side of (2) is a non-increasing function of \( u \) and the right side of (2) is an increasing function of \( u \). Denote the Nash equilibrium by \( u_a(\beta) \). The assumptions on \( p \) say that the LHS shifts to the right as \( \beta \) increases, leading to a higher equilibrium \( u_a(\beta) \) (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2: Equilibrium Utility of Safe Contracts](image)

Intuitively, as \( \beta \) increases, \( u_s(\beta) \) will surpass \( u^* \), in which case offering a risky contract with the same utility is more profitable for the principal. In fact, as we show later, the safe equilibrium cannot be sustained even before \( u_s(\beta) \) reaches \( u^* \).

To capture the profitability of such deviations for any \( \beta \), define four value functions as
follows.

\[
E \Pi_s(\beta) = p(u_s(\beta), u_s(\beta); \beta) \Pi_s(u_s(\beta)) \\
E \Pi_r(\beta) = \max_{u \in [0,E_A[x]|r]} p(u, u_s(\beta); \beta) \Pi_r(u) \\
E \Pi_r(\beta) = p(u_r(\beta), u_r(\beta); \beta) \Pi_r(u_r(\beta)) \\
E \Pi_s(\beta) = \max_{u \in [0,E_A[x]|s]} p(u; u_r(\beta); \beta) \Pi_s(u)
\]

(3)

Also, define \( u_s^*(\beta) \) to be the maximizer of \( E \Pi_s^*(\beta) \) and \( u_r^*(\beta) \) to be the maximizer of \( E \Pi_r^*(\beta) \).

Therefore, for each \( \beta \), \( E \Pi_s(\beta) \) is the on-path profit if everyone offers a safe contract with utility \( u_s(\beta) \) when the matching efficiency parameter is \( \beta \), and \( E \Pi_r(\beta) \) is the greatest profit from a deviation to a risky contract when the opponent is still offering a safe contract with utility \( u_s(\beta) \). Likewise for \( E \Pi_r, E \Pi_s^* \).

We characterize the Nash equilibria of the competing-principals game via these value functions in the following lemma.

**Lemma 3.1.** \((w,a)\) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the full-information competing-principals game with matching efficiency parameter \( \beta \) if and only if

\[
E_A[w(x)|a] = u_a(\beta) \\
E \Pi_a(\beta) \geq E \Pi_a^*(\beta)
\]

where \( a, a' \in \{s, r\}, a \neq a' \) and \( u_a(\beta) \) is the equilibrium in the corresponding auxiliary game.

**Proof.** Follows directly from definitions. \( \square \)

The next lemma shows that there are profitable risky deviations from offering the safe contract if and only if \( \beta \) is higher than a threshold \( \beta_s \). Similarly, there are profitable safe action deviations from a risky contract if and only if the competition intensity is below a threshold \( \beta_r \).

**Lemma 3.2.**

\( E \Pi_s(\beta) \) crosses \( E \Pi_s^*(\beta) \) exactly once, from above at some \( \beta_s \in (0, \infty) \).
\( E\Pi_r(\beta) \) crosses \( E\Pi_s^u(\beta) \) exactly once, from below at some \( \beta_r \in (0, \infty) \).

Moreover, \( \beta_r < \beta_s \).

The intuition is simple. When \( \beta \) increases, a deviation from the safe equilibrium to the risky action becomes more attractive because larger wages are more effective at leading to a successful hire, and \( \Pi_r(u) \) eventually becomes higher than \( \Pi_s(u) \). Likewise, when \( \beta \) decreases, a deviation from the risky equilibrium to the safe action becomes more attractive due to the same logic working backwards.\(^{14}\)

We can now state our first main result:

**Theorem 1.** Under full information, there exist \( 0 < \beta_r < \beta_s \) such that

1. A safe equilibrium exists if and only if \( \beta \leq \beta_s \).

2. A risky equilibrium exists if and only if \( \beta \geq \beta_r \).

**Proof.** Follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2. \( \Box \)

That is, safe action equilibria exist only when competition is weak, and risky action equilibria exist only when competition is intense. There is also an intermediate region of competition where both types of equilibria are possible.

As one implication of our result, policies such as CEO compensation disclosure or wage transparency will potentially lead to more intense competition among the principals. These could lead to, aside from higher CEO pay, more risk-taking.

\(^{14}\text{We use an envelope theorem argument to show the desired single-crossing. However, the differentiability of } u_s(\cdot), u_r(\cdot) \text{ is in general not guaranteed, and this leads to some technical difficulties that we deal with in the appendix.}\)
4 Factors That Intensify Competition and Risk-taking

4.1 Increased Fund Scale

What is the relationship between the size of a fund and its performance? Chen et al. (2004) finds that the scale of a mutual fund erodes its performance due to liquidity and organizational diseconomies. In addition to liquidity, Pollet and Wilson (2008) finds funds respond to growth by increasing the number of shares already held rather than diversifying the portfolio, which leads to diminishing returns of scale.

Our model shows a similar result via a different channel: competition. As the fund scales up, the competition for managerial talents intensifies because the payoffs from a successful hire to a principal increase. If the equilibrium wage is driven up disproportionately more as fund scale increases, the market equilibrium will switch from safe to risky contracts.

Specifically, suppose that the fund size is some $\alpha \geq 1$ and that there is no diversification option but to increase the number of shares for the same investment. The returns of the investment are now $\alpha x$, where $x$ has the same densities $f(x|s), f(x|r), f_A(x|r)$ as before. Let $\Pi_s(u, \alpha), \Pi_r(u, \alpha)$ denote the corresponding optimal principal payoffs when implementing $a = s$ or $a = r$ respectively. They are characterized exactly the same as in Appendix A.1. except that there is now a scalar $\alpha$.

Let $u_s(\beta, \alpha)$ and $u_r(\beta, \alpha)$ be the symmetric equilibria in the corresponding auxiliary game $p(u_1, u_2; \beta) \Pi_s(u_1, \alpha)$ and $p(u_1, u_2; \beta) \Pi_r(u_1, \alpha)$. It follows directly from the FOCs that $u_s$ and $u_r$ are increasing in $\alpha$ whenever $u_s, u_r > 0$.

How much the competitive pay (equilibrium indirect utility) increases with respect to $\alpha$ depends on the matching function. In this subsection we assume, in addition to Assumption 1, that the matching probability depends only on the difference of the indirect utilities offered.

Assumption 2. There exists a function $q : \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow (0, 1]$ such that $p(u_1, u_2; \beta) = q(u_1 - u_2; \beta)$ for all $u_1, u_2$ and $\beta$. 
Remark 4.1. Note that Assumption 2 implies that
\[
\frac{p_1(u, u; \beta)}{p(u, u; \beta)}
\]
is constant in \(u\) and that
\[
\frac{p_1(u_1, u_2; \beta)}{p(u_1, u_2; \beta)} = -\frac{p_2(u_1, u_2; \beta)}{p(u_1, u_2; \beta)}
\]
for all \(u_1, u_2, \beta\).

In particular, the normal noise case of Example 2.1 satisfies this assumption. One interpretation of this assumption is that the agent values additional utility the same at all levels of utility, and thus only considers the difference in utility when choosing a firm. For instance, in the normal noise example the agent’s utility may be the sum of the utility of the contract plus an idiosyncratic firm-specific utility \(\varepsilon_i\). The agent goes to whichever firm offers it the highest overall utility, but the firms do not observe the values of \(\varepsilon_i\) when making their offers.

The equilibrium indirect utility \(u\) is determined by the FOC
\[
\frac{p_1(u, u; \beta)}{p(u, u; \beta)} = -\frac{\Pi'_a(u, \alpha)}{\Pi_a(u, \alpha)}
\]
The left-hand side is downward sloping and the right-hand side is upward sloping. An increase in \(\alpha\) shifts the right-hand side curve to the right and therefore increases \(u\). Assumption 2 implies that the left-hand side is flat, maximizing the impact of the increase of \(\alpha\) on the equilibrium indirect utility.

Under Assumption 2, we can generalize Theorem 1 as follows.

Theorem 2. For every \(\alpha \geq 1\) there exists \(0 < \beta_r(\alpha) < \beta_s(\alpha)\) such that

1. A safe symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if \(\beta \leq \beta_s(\alpha)\)

2. A risky symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if \(\beta \geq \beta_r(\alpha)\).

Furthermore, \(\beta_s(\cdot), \beta_r(\cdot)\) are decreasing, and \(\lim_{\alpha \to \infty} \beta_s(\alpha) = 0\).

In particular, for any \(\beta > 0\), as long as the scale is large enough, the risky equilibrium is the only equilibrium.
4.2 Relaxing Limited Liability Constraints

What is the implication for equilibrium contracts if we allow either the principals or the agent to take debts?

First, if we allow the agent to take debts, then implementing the risky action could be optimal even for low values of reservation utility. The principal can take advantage of the heterogeneous beliefs by making a bet such that agent pays the principal when the return of the project is low.

Formally, we relax the limited liability constraint to

$$-L \leq w(x) \leq x$$

where $L$ is the parameter of the amount of debt the agent can take. Then we have the following result.

Theorem 3. Consider the problem

\[
\max_{w} E[x - w(x)|r] \\
\text{s.t.} \\
- L \leq w(x) \leq x \\
E_A[w(x)|r] = u
\]

Let $\Pi_r(u, L)$ denote its value function. Then there exists an $L^*$ such that for all $L > L^*$,

$$\Pi_r(u, L) > E[x|s] - u$$

for all $u$. Furthermore, the optimal wage scheme satisfies IC.

A direct implication is that when $L$ is large enough, there will be no safe equilibrium in the competing principals game, regardless of $\beta$.

Next, suppose the principal can take debts $L$. That is,

$$0 \leq w(x) \leq x + L$$

A higher $L$ increases the principal’s payoff from implementing the risky action, for each level of reservation utility. However, it is no longer the case that $\Pi_r(L, u) > \Pi_s(u)$ for all $u$ for sufficiently high $L$: A higher $L$ means that the principal can promise the agent more payoff. But if $u$ is low, there is no need to promise the agent a high payoff. The principal’s payoff from implementing the safe action is unchanged: $\Pi_s(u, L) = E[x|s] - u$.

We have the following generalization of Theorem 1:

**Theorem 4.** Suppose the limited liability constraint is $0 \leq w(x) \leq x + L$. There exists $0 < \beta_r(L) < \beta_s(L)$ such that

1. A safe equilibrium exists if and only if $\beta \leq \beta_s(L)$

2. A risky equilibrium exists if and only if $\beta \geq \beta_r(L)$.

Furthermore, both $\beta_s(\cdot)$ and $\beta_r(\cdot)$ are decreasing in $L$.

5 Discussion: Hidden Action

Up to now, we have assumed that the agent’s choice of investment option is contractible. When the principal cannot tell which project is safe and which is risky (but still has beliefs regarding the payoffs), she must instead provide the appropriate incentives for the agent to take the principal-preferred action.

We find that moral hazard can deter competition. We show that it is not be possible to implement the safe action in an incentive-compatible way if the agent’s reservation utility is high. This may hold even at ranges of the reservation utility for which the principal’s profit from the safe action is higher in the original model. Principals may thus be reluctant to offer a higher indirect utility within this range, as they would be forced to switch to the risky action and suffer a potentially large drop in profits. Indeed, we show that under certain conditions safe action equilibria exist for all values of the matching efficiency parameter $\beta$. 
5.1 Optimal Profit

We first characterize the optimal profit of a single principal when the reservation utility \( u \) of the agent is exogenously given.

The principal’s contract design problem is

\[
\max_{(w,a)} \int_0^1 (x - w(x)) f(x | a) dx
\]

subject to

\[
E_A[w(x)|a] \geq u \tag{IR}
\]
\[
E_A[w(x)|a] \geq E_A[w(x)|a'] \tag{IC}
\]
\[
0 \leq w(x) \leq x \tag{LL}
\]

Define \( \tilde{\Pi}_a(u) \) as the value function of the principal when she implements action \( a \in \{s, r\} \). A wage scheme \( w \) implements action \( a \) if \( w \) satisfies individual rationality (IR), incentive compatibility (IC) and limited liability (LL).

First, we claim that due to the IC constraint, the safe action is now implementable when \( u \in [0, \tilde{u}] \) for some \( \tilde{u} < E[x | s] \). The profit over this range will still be the same as before.

To see this, note that when the reservation utility is \( u = E[x | s] \), the principal has to give a wage scheme such that \( w(x) = x \) a.s. But the assumption that \( E_A[x | r] > E[x | s] \) implies that the agent will pick the risky action. Furthermore, whenever \( w, w' \) implement \( s \) with reservation utilities \( u, u' \) respectively, the convex combinations of \( w \) and \( w' \) implements \( s \) with reservation utilities in-between \( u \) and \( u' \).

Second, the above convex combination argument shows that \( \tilde{\Pi}_r(u) \) is concave and that the risky action is still implementable for any reservation utility \( u \in [0, E_A[x | r]] \). However, it may be that \( \tilde{\Pi}_r(u) < \Pi_r(u) \) for some \( u \) due to the additional IC constraint.

There are two possible cases. First, \( \tilde{\Pi}_s(\tilde{u}) > \tilde{\Pi}_r(\tilde{u}) \). Second, there exists \( u^* < \tilde{u} \) such that \( \tilde{\Pi}_s(u^*) = \tilde{\Pi}_r(u^*) \). Figure 3 shows the two cases.

**Remark 5.1.** Whether \( \tilde{u} < u^* \) depends on the configuration of the beliefs. Recall that \( u^* \) is the cutoff of agent’s reservation utility above which the optimal contract is risky. Therefore,
if action $r$ is perceived to be very inferior by the principal, then the principal will not want to design a risky contract unless the reservation utilities are really high, so $u^* > \hat{u}$. On the other hand, if the risky action is perceived to be just slightly inferior by the principal, then the principal would like to take advantage of the agent’s “wrong” belief even if his reservation utility is low, so $u^* < \hat{u}$.\footnote{As a numerical example, let $f(x|s) = 2x$ and $f_A(x|r) = 3x^2$. This implies $\hat{u} = 0.468$. If $f(x|r) = 1$, then $u^* = 0.26 < \hat{u}$. If $f(x|r) = 10(1 - x)^9$ then $u^* = 0.58 > \hat{u}$.}

Figure 3: Optimal Profits With Hidden Action

\section*{5.2 Competition with Hidden Action}

The fact that principals who want to implement the safe action cannot offer a utility higher than $\hat{u}$ has significant implications for the set of equilibria under $\beta$.

First, suppose the principals offer safe contracts and $\beta$ is such that the equilibrium utility is $\hat{u}$. If a principal wants to deviate and offer the agent a higher utility, she has no choice...
but to offer a risky contract. This entails a discrete loss of profit when $\Pi_s(\bar{u}) > \Pi_r(\bar{u})$ (left of Figure 3). Therefore, if the increase in the probability of hiring the agent does not compensate this loss, both principals would prefer to offer the safe contract.

This may be true even when $\beta$ is arbitrarily large. For example, suppose that $p(u, u; \beta) = 0.5$ and that $0.5\Pi_s(\bar{u}) \geq \Pi_r(\bar{u})$. The term $0.5\Pi_s(\bar{u})$ is the expected profit of offering the safe contract and the term $\Pi_r(\bar{u})$ is the upper bound of the profit of offering the risky contract when $\beta$ is large (any risky contract with utility $\bar{u} + \epsilon$ hires the agent with probability close to 1). Under such a set of parameters, the safe action equilibrium is supported for all levels of $\beta$.

This example shows how hidden actions can increase efficiency with competition. Intuitively, hidden actions restrict the amount of competition between principals and lower the utilities that are offered in equilibrium. This in turn increases the range of safe action equilibria that can be supported.

We note that the set of risky action equilibria can also be affected by hidden actions. Suppose the principals both offer risky contracts. Deviations to safe contracts must offer the agent no more than $\bar{u}$ utility, making such deviations more restrictive and less attractive. However, the IC constraint can also limit the set of possible risky contracts, and thus $\Pi_r(u) \leq \Pi_r(u)$. Risky contracts may thus be less attractive as well. The overall effect on the set of $\beta$ that support risky equilibria is therefore ambiguous.

Another technical problem is that $\Pi_r(u)$ may be non-differentiable at $u$’s where the IC constraint changes from binding to non-binding. This further complicates the equilibrium analysis. One condition that eliminates such complications is if $f(x|s)$ monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) dominates $f(x|r)$ and $f_A(x|r)$ also MLRP dominates $f(x|s)$. Under this assumption, it can be shown that the optimal risky contract is always of the form $w(x) = x$ whenever $x \geq \bar{x}$ and $w(x) = 0$ otherwise. In particular, $w$ is increasing, and the IC constraint is therefore always strict. This implies that $\Pi_r(u) = \Pi_r(u)$ for all $u$, and that the set of $\beta$ that support the risky equilibrium becomes weakly larger.
6 Conclusion

This paper studied the effects of labor market competition on risk-taking in a heterogeneous belief model. The contracts offered by the principals are determined by the competitive pressure to offer the agent a greater share of the project. High-powered incentive contracts are used when the competition for managerial talent is intense, as in a financial bubble. Specific factors that increase competition include larger firm sizes and greater debt capacities.

We assumed risk-neutral utilities and heterogeneous beliefs for ease of tractability. A model with risk-averse principals and agents does not in general have an analytical solution and the relevant cutoffs on the reservation utility would be difficult to pin down. However, the qualitative results in our paper do not seem to depend on risk-neutrality.

Our paper highlights the potential reasons why optimistic beliefs and risky investments seem to prevail so frequently in financial bubbles. The higher levels of labor market competition in a bubble naturally lead to greater levels of manager optimism and risk-taking. Regulations that seek to improve corporate governance and monitoring of manager decisions must avoid inadvertently increasing a firm’s competitive drive and risk-taking motivations even further.
A Proofs of Main Results

We first establish Proposition 3.1.

Define

\[ W = \{ w : [0, 1] \to \mathbb{R} : w \text{ is Lebesgue measurable and } 0 \leq w(x) \leq x, \forall x \in [0, 1] \}. \]

Equip \( W \) with the \( L^1 \) norm so that \( W \) is complete and totally bounded, hence compact.\(^{16}\)

The optimal profit for a risky contract is given by

\[ \Pi_r(u) = \max_{w \in W} E[x|r] - E[w(x)|r] \]

\[ \text{s.t. } E_A[w(x)|r] \geq u \]

(4)

The optimal wage exists because we are maximizing a linear function over a compact set. Note also that \( \Pi_r(E[x|s]) > 0 \) because \( E_A[x|r] > E[x|s] \).

**Proof of Proposition 3.1.** To see that \( \Pi_r \) is weakly concave on \([0, E_A[x|r]]\), let \( 0 \leq u_1 < u_2 \leq E_A[x|r] \). Let \( \rho \in (0, 1) \). Let \( w_1, w_2 \) be the corresponding optimal wage. Then \( \rho w_1 + (1 - \rho)w_2 \in W \) and it satisfies the IR constraint when the reservation utility is \( \rho u_1 + (1 - \rho)u_2 \), but it may not be optimal. Therefore

\[ \Pi_r(\rho u_1 + (1 - \rho)u_2) \geq E[x|r] - E[\rho w_1 + (1 - \rho)w_2|r] = \rho \Pi_r(u_1) + (1 - \rho)\Pi_r(u_2) \]

Now we can show that \( \Pi_r \) and \( \Pi_s \) cross exactly once. Since \( \Pi_r \) is weakly concave, it is continuous on the interior of its domain, so \( \Pi_r \) and \( \Pi_s \) cross at some \( u^* \). Assume to the contrary that there exists \( u_1 < u_2 \) such that \( \Pi_r(u_1) = \Pi_s(u_1) \) and \( \Pi_r(u_2) = \Pi_s(u_2) \), then \( u_2 < E[x|s] \). Let \( \rho \) be such that

\[ u_2 = \rho u_1 + (1 - \rho)E[x|s]. \]

\(^{16}\)A Cauchy sequence in \( W \in L^1([0, 1]) \) has a convergent subsequence to some \( w \in L^1([0, 1]) \) because of \( L^1 \)-completeness. The limit \( w \) is s.t. \( 0 \leq w(x) \leq x \) a.e. and can be replaced with a \( \tilde{w} \in W \) s.t. \( \tilde{w} = w \) a.e. Total boundedness is a consequence of the Kolmogorov–Riesz Compactness Theorem.
Then

\[
\rho \Pi_r(u_1) + (1 - \rho) \Pi_r(E[x|s]) > \rho \Pi_s(u_1) + (1 - \rho) \Pi_s(E[x|s])
\]

\[
= \Pi_s(u_2) = \Pi_r(u_2)
\]

where the first equality follows from the linearity of \( \Pi_s \). This violates the fact that \( \Pi_r \) is weakly concave.

In what follows, we make preparations to prove Lemma 3.2. This involves two key steps:
1. Show that the \( u_r(\cdot) \), characterized by (2) and has one-sided derivatives. \( u_s(\cdot) \) is easier since \( \Pi_s(u) \) is linear.)
2. Apply a one-sided version of the Envelope Theorem to \( E\Pi_a, E\Pi'_a \) and show single-crossing.

To show that \( u_r(\cdot) \) has one-sided derivatives, we need to show that the implicit function (2) that defines \( u_r(\cdot) \) has one-sided derivatives. That is, \( \Pi''_r(u^+) \), \( \Pi''_r(u^-) \) exist. Such a task can be achieved by a more refined characterization of the optimal wages that solve (4) in terms of the Lagrange multiplier of the constrained maximization problem, which in turn captures how the multiplier changes when the reservation utility changes.

Let

\[
m = \min_{x \in [0,1]} \frac{f(x|r)}{f_A(x|r)}, \quad M = \max_{x \in [0,1]} \frac{f(x|r)}{f_A(x|r)}
\]

For each \( \lambda \in [m, M] \), define

\[
A_\lambda = \{ x \in [0,1] : \lambda f_A(x|r) > f(x|r) \}
\]

\[
B_\lambda = \{ x \in [0,1] : \lambda f_A(x|r) < f(x|r) \}
\]

\[
C_\lambda = \{ x \in [0,1] : \lambda f_A(x|r) = f(x|r) \}
\]

\[
W_\lambda = \left\{ w \in W, w(x) = \begin{cases} x, & x \in A_\lambda \\ 0, & x \in B_\lambda \\ \in [0, x], & x \in C_\lambda \end{cases} \right\}
\]

Since the density functions are continuous, \( A_\lambda, B_\lambda \) are unions of open intervals (relative to \([0,1]\)) and \( C_\lambda \) is a closed set.
The Lagrangian to the principal’s constrained maximization problem (4) is

\[ L(w(\cdot), \lambda) = E[x - w(x)|r] + \lambda(E_A[w(x)|r] - u) \]

In particular, the Lagrange multiplier method gives that if \( w \) solves the problem, there exists \( \lambda \in [m, M] \) such that

\[ \tilde{w} \in \mathcal{W}_\lambda, \quad E_A[\tilde{w}(x)|r] = u. \]  

(5)

and that \( w = \tilde{w} \) almost everywhere. Conversely, any \( w \) satisfying (5) gives the principal the same payoff \( \Pi_r(u) \). Consequently, we will focus the characterization of optimal contracts within the sets \( \mathcal{W}_\lambda \).

Define a correspondence \( \Phi : [m, M] \to 2^{[0, E_A[x|r]]} \) by

\[ \Phi(\lambda) = \{ u : \exists w \in \mathcal{W}_\lambda \text{ s.t. } E_A[w(x)|r] = u \} \]

For each \( \lambda \in [m, M] \), since \( \mathcal{W}_\lambda \) is non-empty, \( \Phi(\lambda) \) is non-empty valued.

**Lemma A.1.**  
1. Let \( m \leq \lambda < \lambda' \leq M \) and \( w \in \mathcal{W}_\lambda, w' \in \mathcal{W}_{\lambda'} \), then \( E_A[w(x)|r] < E_A[w'(x)|r] \).

2. For each \( \lambda \in [m, M] \), \( \Phi(\lambda) \) is a closed interval.

3. \( 0 \in \Phi(m), E_A[x|r] \in \Phi(M) \).

4. \( \Phi \) is upper-hemicontinuous.

**Proof of Lemma A.1.**  
1. Let

\[ \overline{w}(x) = \begin{cases} x, & x \in A_{\lambda'} \\ 0, & x \notin A_{\lambda'} \end{cases} \]

and

\[ \underline{w}(x) = \begin{cases} x, & x \notin B_{\lambda} \\ 0, & x \in B_{\lambda} \end{cases} \]

Then \( \overline{w} \in \mathcal{W}_{\lambda'}, \underline{w} \in \mathcal{W}_\lambda, w'(x) \geq \overline{w}(x) \geq \underline{w}(x) \geq w(x) \) for all \( x \in [0, 1] \), hence \( E_A[w'(x)|r] \geq E_A[w(x)|r] \).
Let \( \epsilon \) be such that \( \lambda + \epsilon < \lambda' - \epsilon \). Then the set

\[
S = \{ x : (\lambda' - \epsilon) f_A(x|r) > f(x|r) \} \cap \{ x : (\lambda + \epsilon) f_A(x|r) < f(x|r) \}
\]

is open and \( \overline{w}(x) - \underline{w}(x) = x \) on \( S \). Since \( f_A(x|r) \) is continuous and everywhere positive,

\[
E_A[w'(x) - w(x)|r] \geq \int_S x f_A(x|r) dx > 0.
\]

2. Fix \( \lambda \). For each \( q \in [0,1] \), define

\[
w_q(x) = \begin{cases} 
  x, & x \in A_{\lambda} \cup (C_{\lambda} \cap [0,q]) \\
  0, & \text{else}
\end{cases}
\]

Then \( w_q(x) \in \mathcal{W}_\lambda \) for any \( q \in [0,1] \). Furthermore, for any \( u \in \Phi(\lambda) \), \( E_A[w_0|r] \leq u \leq E_A[w_1|r] \). We now claim that the mapping \( q \mapsto E_A[w_q(x)|r] \) is continuous. To see this, note that for any \( q_2 > q_1 \),

\[
E_A[w_{q_2}(x) - w_{q_1}(x)|r] = E_A[x 1_{\{q_1,q_2\}} \cap C_\lambda(x)|r] \leq N(q_2 - q_1)
\]

where \( N = \max_{x \in [0,1]} f_A(x|r) \). This shows that \( \Phi(\lambda) \) is the image of the interval \([0,1]\) under a continuous mapping, hence is itself an interval.

Furthermore, let \( u \) be a limit point of the interval \( \Phi(\lambda) \). Let \( \{u_n\} \) be a sequence in \( \Phi(\lambda) \) that monotonically converges to \( u \). Choose \( q_n \in [0,1] \) such that \( E_A[w_{q_n}|r] = u_n \). Then \( q_n \) is monotonic, with limit \( q \), and \( w_{q_n} = x 1_{A_{\lambda} \cup (C_{\lambda} \cap [0,q_n])} \) is a monotone sequence of bounded measurable functions. In particular, \( w = \lim_{n \to \infty} w_{q_n} = x 1_{A_{\lambda} \cup (C_{\lambda} \cap [0,q])} \) is in \( \mathcal{W}_\lambda \) and the Monotone Convergence Theorem implies \( u = \lim_{n \to \infty} E_A[w_{q_n}|r] = E_A[w|r] \in \Phi(\lambda) \). Hence \( \Phi(\lambda) \) is closed.

3. Let \( w \) be s.t. \( w(x) = 0 \) for all \( x \) and \( w' \) be s.t. \( w'(x) = x \) for all \( x \). The claim follows from \( w \in \mathcal{W}_m \) and \( w' \in \mathcal{W}_M \).

4. Let \( \lambda_n \to \lambda \) and \( u_n \in \Phi(\lambda_n) \) such that \( u_n \to u \). Without loss of generality (passing to subsequence if necessary), assume \( \lambda_n \) monotonically converges to \( \lambda \). For each \( n \), let
\( w_n \in \mathcal{W}_{\lambda_n} \) such that \( E_A[w_n|r] = u_n \). In particular, \( w_n(x) \) is a monotonic sequence because the set on which \( w_n(x) = x \) gets either strictly larger or strictly smaller as \( \lambda_n \) is increasing or decreasing. Hence the sequence has a measurable point-wise limit \( w \). Since the Monotone Convergence Theorem gives \( u = \lim_{n \to \infty} u_n = E_A[w|r] \), if \( w \in \mathcal{W}_{\lambda} \) then it is immediate that \( u \in \Phi(\lambda) \).

To see that \( w \in \mathcal{W}_{\lambda} \), first observe that \( w \) is measurable and \( 0 \leq w(x) \leq x \) because each \( w_n \) is. It therefore suffices to show that \( w(x) = x \) for \( x \in A_{\lambda} \) and \( w(x) = 0 \) for \( x \in B_{\lambda} \). Suppose \( \lambda_n \) increases to \( \lambda \). Then \( w_n \) is an increasing sequence. If \( x \in A_{\lambda} \) then there exists \( n \) such that \( x \in A_{\lambda_n} \). So \( w(x) = \lim_{n \to \infty} w_n(x) = x \) because \( \{w_n\} \) is an increasing sequence. If \( x \in B_{\lambda} \), then \( x \in B_{\lambda_n} \) for all \( n \), and therefore \( w(x) = \lim_{n \to \infty} w_n(x) = 0 \).

Suppose \( \lambda_n \) decreases to \( \lambda \). Then \( w_n \) is a decreasing sequence. If \( x \in A_{\lambda} \), then \( x \in A_{\lambda_n} \) for all \( n \) and therefore \( w(x) = \lim_{n \to \infty} w_n(x) = x \). If \( x \in B_{\lambda} \), then \( x \in B_{\lambda_n} \) for some \( n \). Hence \( w(x) = \lim_{n \to \infty} w_{q_n}(x) = 0 \) because \( \{w_n\} \) is a decreasing sequence.

\[ \square \]

**Lemma A.2.** The function \( \lambda : [0, E_A[x|r]] \to [m, M] \) defined by \( \lambda(u) = \Phi^{-1}(u) \) is a non-decreasing continuous function. Furthermore, for every \( u \in [0, E_A[x|r]] \), any solution \((w, \lambda)\) to (5) satisfies \( \lambda = \lambda(u) \) and \( w \in \mathcal{W}_{\lambda(u)} \).

**Proof.** Item 1 of Lemma A.1 implies that \( \Phi^{-1}(u) \) is at most a singleton and Item 3 implies that \( \Phi^{-1}(0), \Phi^{-1}(E_A[x|r]) \) are non-empty. To see that \( \Phi^{-1}(u) \) is non-empty for \( 0 < u < E_A[x|r] \), let

\[
L_u = \{ \lambda : \max \Phi(\lambda) < u \} \\
R_u = \{ \lambda : \min \Phi(\lambda) > u \}
\]

Lemma A.1 implies that \( L_u, R_u \) and a common limit point \( \lambda^* \) partition \([m, M]\) into left and right intervals. In particular, let \( \lambda_n \) be an increasing sequence in \( L_u \) converging to \( \lambda^* \) and \( \bar{\lambda}_n \) be a decreasing sequence in \( R_u \) converging to \( \lambda^* \). Define \( u_n = \max \Phi(\lambda_n) \) and \( \bar{u}_n = \min \Phi(\bar{\lambda}_n) \), which exist because \( \Phi \) is closed. Moreover, \( \{u_n\}, \{\bar{u}_n\} \) are monotonic hence \( u_n \) converges to a
limit $u$, $u_n$ converges to a limit $u$, with $u \leq u \leq u$ and $u, u \in \Phi(\lambda^*)$ by upper-hemicontinuity. Since $\Phi(\lambda^*)$ is an interval, $u \in \Phi(\lambda^*)$. Therefore $\Phi^{-1}(u) = \lambda^*$.

That $\lambda(\cdot)$ is non-decreasing and continuous follow from Lemma A.1. If $(w, \lambda)$ solves (5), then by definition $u \in \Phi(\lambda)$ hence $\Phi^{-1}(u) = \lambda = \lambda(u)$.

Lemma A.3. $\lambda(u)$ is directionally differentiable.

Proof. Let

$$\phi(x) = \frac{f(x|r)}{f_A(x|r)},$$

which is well-defined and continuously differentiable for $x \in [0, 1]$.

We show that $\lambda'(u^+)$ exists. The argument for $\lambda'(u^-)$ is identical.

We will use the following fact: For any $a$, there exists $\varepsilon$ such that for any $a < b < a + \varepsilon$, \{$x : a < \phi(x) < b$\} is a disjoint union of $N < \infty$ open intervals \{$I_i$\}, where $N$ depends only on $\varepsilon$ (take some $I_i$ to be the empty set if necessary), and $\phi$ is strictly monotonic on each $I_i$.

It follows that for any $a < b < a + \varepsilon$, \{$x : \phi(x) = b$\} is a set of finitely many points (equal to the number of the intervals $I_i$), hence it has zero Lebesgue measure.

Given $u \in \Phi(\lambda(u))$. Assume $u$ is in the interior of $\Phi(\lambda(u))$, then $\lambda'(u) = 0$. Assume $u$ is a limit point of $\Phi(\lambda)$ and that $u' \not\in \Phi(\lambda)$ for every $u' > u$. Then $u = E_A[w|r]$ where $w$ is such that $w(x) = x$ if $x \not\in B_{\lambda(u)}$ 0 otherwise. Since $\lambda(u)$ is continuous, there exists $\delta$ such that if $u < u' < u + \delta$, then $\lambda(u') - \lambda(u) < \varepsilon$, and $\lambda(u') > \lambda(u)$. For any such $u'$, $u' = E_A[w'|r]$ where $w'(x) = x$ whenever $x \in A_{\lambda(u')}$ and $w(x) = 0$ otherwise (since \{$x : \phi(x) = \lambda(u')$\} is of measure zero). Therefore,

$$u' - u = E_A[w' - w|r] = \int_{\{x : \lambda(u) < \phi(x) < \lambda(u')\}} x f_A(x|r)dx$$

Let \{$x : \lambda(u) < \phi(x) < \lambda(u')$\} = $\cup_{i=1}^n(a_i, b_i)$, where the intervals are ordered: $a_1 \leq b_1 \leq a_2 \leq \ldots \leq b_n$. For each $i$, the mean value theorem for integrals gives a point $x_i(u') \in (a_i, b_i)$, such that

$$u' - u = \sum_{i=1}^N (b_i - a_i)x_i(u') f_A(x_i(u')|r)$$

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For each \((a_i, b_i)\) such that \(b_i - a_i > 0\), the mean value theorem gives some \(y_i \in (\lambda(u), \lambda(u'))\) such that
\[
b_i - a_i = |(\phi^{-1})'(y_i)|(\lambda(u') - \lambda(u))
\]
Let
\[
m(u') = \min_{i: I_i \neq \emptyset} \inf_{k_i \in (a_i, b_i)} |(\phi^{-1})'(k_i)|
\]
\[
M(u') = \max_{i: I_i \neq \emptyset} \sup_{k_i \in (a_i, b_i)} |(\phi^{-1})'(k_i)|
\]
Let
\[
K(u') = \sum_{i: I_i \neq \emptyset} x_i(u') f_A(x_i(u)|r)
\]
Then we have
\[
m(u')K(u') (\lambda(u') - \lambda(u)) \leq u' - u \leq M(u')(K(u') (\lambda(u') - \lambda(u))
\]
Therefore
\[
\frac{1}{M(u')K(u')} \leq \frac{\lambda(u') - \lambda(u)}{u' - u} \leq \frac{1}{m(u')K(u')}
\]
Note that \(m(u')\) is bounded away from zero and that \(\sup_{u' \in (u,u+\delta)} K(u') < \infty\). Since \(\phi\) is continuously differentiable, \(\lim_{u' \to u} K(u')(M(u') - m(u')) = 0\), this implies \(\lambda(u)\) has a right derivative.

The next lemma is a version of the Implicit Function Theorem that we will use to show that the Nash equilibrium defined via the first-order condition is directionally differentiable.

**Lemma A.4.** Suppose \(F(\beta, u) = 0\) defines an implicit function \(u(\cdot)\) at a neighborhood of \(\beta\) that is strictly increasing and continuous. Suppose that either

1. \(F(\beta, u)\) is differentiable in \(\beta\), \(\partial F/\partial \beta\) is continuous in \(u\), and \(F(\beta, u)\) is directionally differentiable in \(u\), or

2. \(F(\beta, u)\) is directionally differentiable in \(\beta\), differentiable in \(u\) and \(\partial F/\partial u\) is continuous in \(\beta\).
Then \( u(\cdot) \) is directionally differentiable at \( \beta \).

**Proof.** Let \( \Delta \beta > 0 \). Note that

\[
F(\beta + \Delta \beta, u(\beta + \Delta \beta)) - F(\beta, u(\beta)) = 0
\]

Since \( u(\cdot) \) is strictly increasing, we can write

\[
\frac{F(\beta + \Delta \beta, u(\beta + \Delta \beta)) - F(\beta, u(\beta))}{\Delta \beta} + \frac{F(\beta, u(\beta + \Delta \beta)) - F(\beta, u(\beta))}{u(\beta + \Delta \beta) - u(\beta)} \Delta \beta = 0
\]

(6)

\[
\frac{F(\beta + \Delta \beta, u(\beta + \Delta \beta)) - F(\beta + \Delta \beta, u(\beta))}{u(\beta + \Delta \beta) - u(\beta)} \Delta \beta + \frac{F(\beta + \Delta \beta, u(\beta)) - F(\beta, u(\beta))}{\Delta \beta} = 0
\]

(7)

In Case 1, since \( \partial F/\partial \beta \) is continuous in \( u \), letting \( \Delta \beta \to 0 \) in (6) we can obtain

\[
\frac{\partial F(\beta, u(\beta))}{\partial \beta} + \frac{\partial F(\beta, u(\beta) +)}{\partial u} u'(\beta+) = 0
\]

Hence \( u(\cdot) \) is right-differentiable. Performing the same argument with \( \Delta \beta < 0 \) shows that \( u(\cdot) \) is left-differentiable.

In Case 2, since \( \partial F/\partial u \) is continuous in \( \beta \), letting \( \Delta \beta \to 0 \) in (7) we can obtain

\[
\frac{\partial F(\beta, u(\beta))}{\partial u} u'(\beta+) + \frac{\partial F(\beta, u(\beta))}{\partial \beta} = 0
\]

Hence \( u(\cdot) \) is right-differentiable. Performing the same argument with \( \Delta \beta < 0 \) shows \( u(\cdot) \) is left-differentiable.

\( \square \)

**Lemma A.5.** Consider a two player normal form game such that player \( i \)'s payoff is

\[
p(u_i, u_{-i}; \beta) \Pi(u_i),
\]

where player \( i \) chooses action \( u_i \in [0, \bar{u}] \). Suppose \( \Pi \) is strictly decreasing, continuously differentiable, weakly concave, \( \Pi(0) > 0, \Pi(\bar{u}) = 0 \), \( \Pi''(u+), \Pi''(u-) \) exist, and \( p \) satisfies Assumption 1. Then

1. For each \( \beta \) there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium \( u(\beta) \) such that \( u(\cdot) \) is continuously increasing, \( u(0) = 0 \) and \( \lim_{\beta \to \infty} u(\beta) = \bar{u} \).
2. $u(\cdot)$ is directionally differentiable. When $\Pi(u)$ is linear, $u(\cdot)$ is differentiable at any $\beta$ such that $u(\beta) > 0$.

3. Let

$$E\Pi(\beta) = \max_{u_i \in [0, u]} p(u_i, \tilde{u}(\beta), \beta)\Pi(u_i)$$

where $\tilde{u}(\cdot)$ is any continuously increasing and directionally differentiable function. Let $u^*(\beta)$ be the optimal $u_i$ given $\beta$. If either

a. $\tilde{u}$ is directionally differentiable and $\Pi$ is linear, or

b. $\tilde{u}$ is differentiable, or

c. $u^*(\cdot) = \tilde{u}(\cdot)$ and they are directionally differentiable,

Then at any $\beta$ s.t. $u^*(\beta) > 0$,

$$E\Pi'(\beta+) = p_2(u^*(\beta), \tilde{u}(\beta), \beta)\tilde{u}'(\beta+) + p_3(u^*(\beta), \tilde{u}(\beta), \beta)\Pi(u^*(\beta))$$

$$E\Pi'(\beta-) = p_2(u^*(\beta), \tilde{u}(\beta), \beta)\tilde{u}'(\beta-) + p_3(u^*(\beta), \tilde{u}(\beta), \beta)\Pi(u^*(\beta))$$

Proof of Lemma A.5. The first order condition for symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium is

$$\frac{p_1(u, u; \beta)}{p(u, u; \beta)} \leq \frac{-\Pi'(u)}{\Pi(u)}, u \geq 0, \text{with complementary slackness}$$

(9)

By Assumption 1.3, the left-hand side is non-increasing in $u$. Since $\Pi$ is weakly concave and strictly decreasing, the right-hand side is strictly increasing in $u$. Both sides are continuous and the right-hand side ranges from 0 to $\infty$ as $u$ increases from 0 to $\overline{u}$. Therefore, (9) has a unique solution, denoted by $u(\beta)$. By Assumption 1.3, $p$ is log-concave in $u_1$, so $u(\beta)$ is indeed a mutual best response.

That $u(\beta)$ increases from zero to $\overline{u}$ as $\beta \to \infty$ is a consequence of Assumption 1.3, that the left-hand side of (9) increases from zero to infinity as $\beta \to \infty$ for each $u$, and that the right-hand side increases to infinity as $u \to \overline{u}$. The continuity of $u(\cdot)$ follows from the continuity of $p_1/p$ in $\beta$. This proves item 1.
Next, we show item 2. Let
\[ F(\beta, u) = \frac{p_1(u, u; \beta)}{p(u, u; \beta)} + \frac{\Pi'(u)}{\Pi(u)}, \]
which is directionally differentiable in \( u \) and differentiable in \( \beta \). Furthermore, \( \partial F/\partial \beta \) is continuous in \( u \) since \( p \) is \( C^2 \).

Suppose that \( u(\beta) > 0 \), then (9) holds with equality and \( u(\cdot) \) is strictly increasing at \( \beta \). Case 1 of Lemma A.4 then implies that \( u'(+), u'(-) \) exist.

Suppose that \( u(\beta) = 0 \) and that \( u(\beta + \epsilon) = 0 \) for some \( \epsilon > 0 \). Then there is a neighborhood of \( \beta \) such that \( u(\cdot) = 0 \). So \( u(\beta) \) is differentiable. Suppose that \( u(\beta) = 0 \) and that \( u(\beta + \epsilon) > 0 \) for all \( \epsilon > 0 \). The continuity of \( F \) shows that (9) holds with equality. The same argument as in Lemma A.4 shows that \( u(\cdot) \) is right-differentiable at \( \beta \). Since \( u(\beta') = 0 \) for all \( \beta' < \beta \), \( u \) is left-differentiable at \( \beta \) as well. When \( \Pi \) is linear, the FOC that \( u(\beta) > 0 \) satisfies is a \( C^1 \) function, hence the standard Implicit Function Theorem implies that \( u(\cdot) \) is differentiable at \( \beta \).

Finally we show item 3, which is a version of the Envelope Theorem when the maximizer is directionally differentiable.

Since the objective function is differentiable, \( u^*(\beta) \) satisfies the FOC
\[ \frac{p_1(u, \tilde{u}(\beta); \beta)}{p(u, \tilde{u}(\beta); \beta)} \leq \frac{\Pi'(u)}{\Pi(u)}, u \geq 0, \text{ with complementary slackness.} \]

Suppose \( u^*(\beta) > 0 \). Then the FOC is satisfied at a neighborhood of \( \beta \). In Cases a and b an application of Lemma A.4 (Cases 1 and 2 respectively) shows that \( u^* \) is directionally differentiable.

Take \( \epsilon > 0 \). For the sake of brevity, write \( u(\epsilon) = u^*(\beta + \epsilon) \) and \( u = u^*(\beta) \). We have
\[
E\Pi(\beta + \epsilon) - E\Pi(\beta) = p(u(\epsilon), \tilde{u}(\beta + \epsilon); \beta + \epsilon)\Pi(u(\epsilon)) - p(u, \tilde{u}(\beta + \epsilon); \beta + \epsilon)\Pi(u(\epsilon))
\]
\[
+ p(u, \tilde{u}(\beta + \epsilon); \beta + \epsilon)\Pi(u(\epsilon)) - p(u, \tilde{u}(\beta + \epsilon); \beta + \epsilon)\Pi(u)
\]
\[
+ p(u, \tilde{u}(\beta + \epsilon); \beta + \epsilon)\Pi(u) - p(u, \tilde{u}(\beta); \beta + \epsilon)\Pi(u)
\]
\[
+ p(u, \tilde{u}(\beta); \beta + \epsilon)\Pi(u) - p(u, \tilde{u}(\beta); \beta)\Pi(u)
\]

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A similar argument to item 1 using log-concavity of $p$ shows that $u(\epsilon) > u > 0$. Hence

$$\frac{E\Pi(\beta + \epsilon) - E\Pi(\beta)}{\epsilon} = \frac{p(u(\epsilon), u(\epsilon))}{u(\epsilon) - u} \frac{\Pi(u(\epsilon))}{\epsilon} + p(u, -u) \left( \frac{\Pi(u(\epsilon)) - \Pi(u)}{u(\epsilon) - u} \frac{\Pi(u)}{\epsilon} \right) \Pi(u)$$

Taking $\epsilon \to 0$ and noting that $p$ is $C^2$, we get

$$E\Pi'(\beta) = p_1\Pi(u^*(\beta))(u^*)'(\beta) + p_2\Pi(u^*(\beta))\Pi'(\beta) + p_3\Pi(u^*(\beta))$$

since the first two terms combine to zero by the FOC $u^*(\beta) > 0$ must satisfy. Taking $\epsilon < 0$ and performing the same argument takes care of $E\Pi'(\beta)$. 

The following corollary allows us to apply Lemma A.5 to the value functions (3).

**Corollary A.1.** Let $u_s(\cdot), u_r(\cdot)$ be the implicit functions derived in Lemma A.5 when $\Pi_s, \Pi_r$ are in place of $\Pi$, respectively. Then $u_s(\cdot)$ is differentiable and $u_r(\cdot)$ is directionally differentiable.

**Proof.** Since $\Pi_s(u)$ is linear, the case for $u_s(\cdot)$ follows from item 2 of Lemma A.5.

Applying Corollary 5 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) to (4), we get $\Pi'(u) = -\lambda(u)$. It then follows from Lemma A.3 that $\Pi'(u^+, \Pi'(u^-, \Pi(u^-, \Pi(u^+))$ exist. Hence Lemma A.5 is again applicable.

The next two lemmas proves some properties of the equilibrium $u_s(\cdot), u_r(\cdot)$ and of the optimal deviations $u^*_s(\cdot), u^*_r(\cdot)$. 

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Lemma A.6. For all $0 \leq u < E[x|s]$,

$$\frac{1}{\Pi_s(u)} > -\frac{\Pi'_r(u)}{\Pi_r(u)}.$$ \hfill (10)

In addition, $u_s(\beta) < u_r(\beta)$ for all $\beta$ such that $u_s(\beta) > 0$.

Proof. The first-order conditions $u_s, u_r$ must satisfy are:

$$\frac{p_1(u, u; \beta)}{p(u, u; \beta)} \leq \frac{1}{\Pi_s(u)}, u \geq 0, \text{ with complementary slackness}$$

$$\frac{p_1(u, u; \beta)}{p(u, u; \beta)} \leq -\frac{\Pi'_r(u)}{\Pi_r(u)}, u \geq 0, \text{ with complementary slackness}$$

Hence (10) implies $u_s(\beta) < u_r(\beta)$ whenever $u_s(\beta) > 0$.

To see (10), note that $\Pi_s(u) = E[x|s] - u, \Pi_r(u) = E[x - w(x)|r]$ where $w(x) \in W_{\lambda(u)}$, and that $-\Pi'_r(u) = \lambda(u)$. Furthermore, the proof of Lemma A.1 Item 2 implies that we can choose $w(x)$ to be of the form $w(x) = x \cdot 1_{A_{\lambda(u)}} \cup (C_{\lambda(u)} \cap [0, q])(x)$ for some $q \in [0, 1]$. The set $S = A_{\lambda(u)} \cup (C_{\lambda(u)} \cap [0, q])$ on which $w(x) = x$ is a measurable subset of $\{x : \lambda(u) \geq f(x|r)/f_A(x|r)\}$. Let $S^c$ denote its complement. We also write $E[w(x)|r] = \int_S xf(x|r)dx := E[x|r, S]$. $E_A[x|r, S^c], E[x|r, S^c]$ are similarly defined. In particular, $E_A[x|r, S^c] = E_A[x|r] - u$ because the IR constraint is tight.

Suppose to the contrary,

$$\frac{1}{\Pi_s(u)} \leq -\frac{\Pi'_r(u)}{\Pi_r(u)}$$

Then

$$E[x - w(x)|r] \leq \lambda(u)(E[x|s] - u)$$

By the definition of $S$ and $\lambda(u)$,

$$xf_A(x|r)(E[x|r] - E[x|r, S]) \leq xf(x|r)(E[x|s] - u), \quad \forall x \in S^c.$$ 

Integrate the above equation with respect to $x$ over $S^c$ to obtain

$$E_A[x|r, S^c](E[x|r] - E[x|r, S]) \leq E_A[x, S^c](E[x|s] - u)$$
Substitute in $E_A[x|r, S^c] = E_A[x|r] - u, E[x|r, S^c] = E[x|r] - E[x|r, S]$ and carry out a cancellation to get

$$E_A[x|r] \leq E[x|s],$$

a contradiction to our assumption of expected value dominance. \hfill \Box

**Lemma A.7.**

1. $u^*_{s}(\cdot)$ is continuous. $u^*_{s}(0) = 0$.

2. $u^*_{s}(\cdot)$ is continuous and increasing. $\lim_{\beta \to \infty} u^*_{r}(\beta) = E[x|s]$. In particular, there exists $\beta$ s.t. $u^*_{r}(\beta) > u^*$.

**Proof.** The first order condition that $u = u^*_{s}(\beta)$ must satisfy is

$$\frac{p_1(u, u_{s}(\beta); \beta)}{p(u, u_{s}(\beta); \beta)} \leq \frac{-\Pi'_{r}(u)}{\Pi_{s}(u)}, \text{ for } u \geq 0,$$

which defines a continuous function because both sides are continuous. When $\beta = 0$, Assumption 1.3 says that the left-hand side is zero. This forces $u^*_{s}(0) = 0$.

To prove the remaining properties of $u^*_{s}$, first we claim that for all $\beta$,

$$u^*_{s}(\beta) \leq u_{r}(\beta).$$

To see this, simply note that $u^*_{r}(\beta)$ and $u_{r}(\beta)$ satisfy the FOCs

$$\frac{p_1(u, u_{r}(\beta); \beta)}{p(u, u_{r}(\beta); \beta)} \leq \frac{-\Pi'_{r}(u)}{\Pi_{s}(u)}, \text{ for } u \geq 0,$$

By Lemma A.6, $1/\Pi_{s}(u) > -\Pi'_{r}(u)/\Pi_{r}(u)$ for all $u > 0$. Since $p$ is log-concave in $u_1$, it implies $u^*_{r}(\beta) \leq u_{r}(\beta)$ for all $\beta \geq 0$.

To see that $u^*_{s}(\cdot)$ is increasing, note that $p_1(u_1, u_2; \beta)/p(u_1, u_2; \beta)$ is weakly increasing in $\beta$ for all $u_1 \leq u_2$ and weakly increasing in $u_2$. Let $\beta > \beta'$. Suppose to the contrary that $u^*_{s}(\beta) < u^*_{s}(\beta')$. Since $u_{r}(\beta) \geq u_{r}(\beta')$ and $u^*_{r}(\beta) \leq u_{r}(\beta)$, we have

$$\frac{p_1(u^*_{s}(\beta), u_{r}(\beta); \beta)}{p(u^*_{s}(\beta), u_{r}(\beta); \beta)} \geq \frac{p_1(u^*_{s}(\beta), u_{r}(\beta'); \beta')}{p(u^*_{s}(\beta), u_{r}(\beta'); \beta')} > \frac{p_1(u^*_{s}(\beta'), u_{r}(\beta'); \beta')}{p(u^*_{s}(\beta'), u_{r}(\beta'); \beta')}.$$
where in the last inequality we used that \( p \) is log-concave in \( u_1 \). However, this violates the FOCs \( u^*_s(\beta) \) and \( u^*_r(\beta') \) must satisfy because \( 1/\Pi_s(u^*_s(\beta)) < 1/\Pi_s(u^*_r(\beta')) \).

To see that \( \lim_{\beta \to \infty} u^*_s(\beta) = E[x|s] \), note that log-concavity of \( p \) with respect to \( u_1 \) implies that

\[
\frac{p_1(u^*_s(\beta), u_r(\beta); \beta)}{p(u^*_s(\beta), u_r(\beta); \beta)} > \frac{p_1(u_r(\beta), u_r(\beta); \beta)}{p(u_r(\beta), u_r(\beta); \beta)}
\]

and the latter tends to infinity as \( \beta \to \infty \). The FOC then implies \( u^*_s(\beta) \to \infty \). \( \square \)

We are finally in a position to prove the single-crossing properties of the value functions (3) that characterize the competing-principals Nash equilibria.

**Proof of Lemma 3.2.** By Proposition 3.1, \( E\Pi_s(\beta) > E\Pi'_s(\beta) \) whenever \( u^*_s(\beta) < u^* \) and \( E\Pi_s(\beta) < E\Pi'_s(\beta) \) whenever \( u_s(\beta) > u^* \). (The principal can simply replace a risky contract with a safe contract and keep the promised utility to the agent fixed, and vice versa.) By Lemma A.5, there is a \( \beta \) such that \( u_s(\beta) > u^* \), and by Lemma A.7 there is a \( \beta \) such that \( u^*_r(\beta) < u^* \). Consequently, \( E\Pi_s \) and \( E\Pi'_s \) cross at least once within \((0, \infty)\).

Let \( \beta_s \) be a point such that \( E\Pi_s(\beta_s) = E\Pi'_s(\beta_s) \). Then \( u_s(\beta_s) \leq u^* \leq u^*_s(\beta_s) \).\(^{17} \) Moreover, since \( \Pi'_s(u^*) > \Pi'_s(u^*) = -1 \), at least one of the inequalities is strict. (Else one of \( u_s, u^*_s \) will violate its FOC.)

By Lemma A.5,

\[
E\Pi'_s(\beta_s) = p_2(u_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)u'_s(\beta_s) + p_3(u_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s))\Pi_s(u_s(\beta_s)) \leq 0
\]

\[
(E\Pi'_s)'(\beta_s) = p_2(u'_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)u'_s(\beta_s) + p_3(u'_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s))\Pi_s(u'_s(\beta_s)) \leq 0
\]

Since \( p(u_s, u_s; \beta_s)\Pi_s(u_s) = E\Pi_s(\beta_s) = E\Pi'_s(\beta_s) = p(u'_s, u_s; \beta_s)\Pi_s(u'_s) \), after substitution and cancellation we obtain

\[
E\Pi'_s(\beta_s) < (E\Pi'_s)'(\beta_s)
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \frac{p_2(u_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)}{p(u_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)}u'_s(\beta_s) + \frac{p_3(u_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)}{p(u_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)} < \frac{p_2(u'_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)}{p(u'_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)}u'_s(\beta_s) + \frac{p_3(u'_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)}{p(u'_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)}
\]

\(^{17}\text{If } u_s(\beta_s) > u^*, \text{ then it has to be } E\Pi'_s(\beta_s) > E\Pi_s(\beta_s) \text{ by Proposition 3.1. Similarly, if } u^*_s(\beta) < u^*, \text{ then it has to be } E\Pi'_s(\beta) < E\Pi_s(\beta).\)}
which follows from the assumptions about $p$. An identical argument shows that this inequality also holds for left-handed derivatives. Therefore, whenever $E\Pi_\star$ and $E\Pi_r^\star$ cross, the former has a more negative slope in both the left and the right directions. Thus $E\Pi_r^\star$ crosses $E\Pi_r$ exactly once, from below.

Now we prove the result for $E\Pi_r(\beta)$. By Proposition 3.1, $E\Pi_r(\beta) < E\Pi_r^\star(\beta)$ whenever $u_r(\beta) < u^*$, and $E\Pi_r(\beta) > E\Pi_r^\star(\beta)$ whenever $u_r^\star(\beta) > u^*$. By Lemma A.5, there is a $\beta$ such that $u_r(\beta) < u^*$ and by Lemma A.7 there is a $\beta$ such that $u_r^\star(\beta) > u^*$. Therefore they cross at least once.

Choose any $\beta_r$ such that

$$E\Pi_r(\beta_r) = E\Pi_r^\star(\beta_r).$$

Then by previous discussions $0 < \beta_r < \infty$. Moreover, $u_r^\star(\beta_r) \leq u^* \leq u_r(\beta_r)$.

A similar argument as before shows that $u_r^\star(\beta_r) < u_r(\beta_r)$. By Lemma A.5,

$$E\Pi_r'(\beta_r+) = (p_2(u_r(\beta_r), u_r(\beta_r); \beta_r)u_r'(\beta_r+) + p_3(u_r(\beta_r), u_r(\beta_r); \beta_r))\Pi_r(u_r(\beta_r)) \leq 0$$

$$(E\Pi_r^\star)'(\beta_r+) = (p_2(u_r^\star(\beta_r), u_r(\beta_r); \beta_r)u_r'(\beta_r+) + p_3(u_r^\star(\beta_r), u_r(\beta_r); \beta_r))\Pi_r(u_r^\star(\beta_r)) \leq 0$$

Since $E\Pi_r(\beta_r) = p(u_r, u_r; \beta_r)\Pi_r(u_r) = p(u_r^\star, u_r; \beta_r)\Pi_r^\star(u_r^\star) = E\Pi_r^\star(\beta_r)$, after substitution and cancellation we obtain

$$E\Pi_r'(\beta_r+) > (E\Pi_r^\star)'(\beta_r+)$$

which again follows from the assumptions about $p$. An identical argument shows the inequality for the left-derivatives.

Consequently, whenever $E\Pi_r^\star$ and $E\Pi_r$ crosses, the former has a more negative left and right derivative. So $E\Pi_r^\star$ crosses $E\Pi_r$ exactly once, from above.

Finally, we prove that $\beta_r < \beta_s$. To do this, we show that at $\beta_s$, the principals strictly prefer not to deviate from the risky equilibrium. By the definition of $\beta_s$, we have $E\Pi_s(\beta_s) = \ldots$

\[18\] If $u_r^\star(\beta_r) > u^*$, then it has to be $E\Pi_r(\beta_r) < E\Pi_r^\star(\beta_r)$ by Proposition 3.1. Similarly, if $u_r(\beta_r) < u^*$, then it has to be $E\Pi_r^\star(\beta_r) > E\Pi_r(\beta_r)$.

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$E\Pi^*_s(\beta_s)$. Fix $\beta = \beta_s$, and consider the optimal best response of the principal with respect to $u_2$. Let $\tilde{u}_a(u_2)$ and $V_a(u_2)$, $a \in \{s, r\}$, denote the solution and value function of

$$\max_u p(u, u_2; \beta_s)\Pi_a(u).$$

Note that for $u_2 = u_s(\beta_s)$, we have $\tilde{u}_s(u_2) = u_s(\beta_s)$, $\tilde{u}_r(u_2) = u'_s(\beta_s)$, and that

$$V_s(u_2) = E\Pi_s(\beta_s) = E\Pi^*_s(\beta_s) = V_r(u_2).$$

Note also that for $u_2 = u_r(\beta_s)$, we have $\tilde{u}_s(u_2) = u'_r(\beta_s)$, $\tilde{u}_r(u_2) = u_r(\beta_s)$, and that

$$V_s(u_2) = E\Pi^*_r(\beta_s), V_r(u_2) = E\Pi_r(\beta_s).$$

We aim to show that whenever $V_s, V_r$ cross each other, $V_s$ must cross $V_r$ from above. This would imply that $V_s$ stays below $V_r$ at all $u_2$ right-ward to the crossing point. In particular, by Lemma A.6 $u_r(\beta_s) > u_s(\beta_s)$, so we would have $E\Pi^*_r(\beta_s) < E\Pi_r(\beta_s)$, and this implies that $\beta_r < \beta_s$.

The standard envelope theorem argument implies that

$$V'_s(u_2) = p_2(u_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)\Pi_s(u_s(\beta_s)) \leq 0$$

$$V'_r(u_2) = p_2(u'_r(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)\Pi_r(u'_r(\beta_s)) \leq 0$$

When $V_s(u_2) = V_r(u_2)$, we have

$$p(u_s(\beta_s), u_s(\beta_s); \beta_s)\Pi_s(u_s(\beta_s)) = p(u'_r(\beta_s), u_r(\beta_s); \beta_s)\Pi_r(u'_r(\beta_s))$$

Therefore, at the crossing point $u_2$, $V'_s(u_2) < V'_r(u_2)$ if and only if

$$\frac{p_2(\tilde{u}_s(u_2), u_2; \beta_s)}{p(\tilde{u}_s(u_2), u_2; \beta_s)} < \frac{p_2(\tilde{u}_r(u_2), u_2; \beta_s)}{p(\tilde{u}_r(u_2), u_2; \beta_s)}$$

(11)

Since $\tilde{u}_s, \tilde{u}_r$ satisfy the first-order conditions

$$\frac{p_1(u, u_2; \beta_s)}{p(u, u_2; \beta_s)} = \frac{1}{\Pi_s(u)}$$

$$\frac{p_1(u, u_2; \beta_s)}{p(u, u_2; \beta_s)} = -\frac{\Pi'_r(u)}{\Pi_r(u)}$$
when they are positive, Lemma A.6 implies that \( \tilde{u}_r(u_2) > \tilde{u}_s(u_2) \) whenever \( \tilde{u}_s(u_2) > 0 \). Now (11) follows from our assumption that \( p_2/p \) is increasing in \( u_1 \).

\[
\square
\]

To prove Theorem 2, we establish the following lemma which governs how fast \( u_s, u_r \) increase with respect to \( \alpha \) and allows the Envelope Theorem (Lemma A.5) to be applied to the value functions with respect to \( \alpha \).

**Lemma A.8.** Under Assumption 2, for all \((\beta, \alpha)\) such that \( u_s(\beta, \alpha) > 0 \) and \( u_r(\beta, \alpha) > 0 \), \( u_s \) is differentiable in \( \alpha \), \( u_r \) is directionally differentiable in \( \alpha \), and

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial u_s(\beta, \alpha)}{\partial \alpha} &\geq \frac{u_s(\beta, \alpha)}{\alpha} \\
\frac{\partial u_r(\beta, \alpha+)}{\partial \alpha} &\geq \frac{u_r(\beta, \alpha)}{\alpha}
\end{align*}
\]

(12) (13)

In particular, for every \( \beta > 0 \) there exists \( \bar{\alpha} > 0 \) such that

\[
u_s(\beta, \alpha) = \begin{cases} 0, & \alpha \leq \bar{\alpha} \\ (\alpha - \bar{\alpha})E[x|s] & \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \end{cases}
\]

(14)

**Proof.** We first show (14), which then implies (12). To see this, note that the by assumption \( p_1/p > 0 \) when \( \beta > 0 \). If \( u_s(\beta, \alpha) = 0 \) for every \( \alpha \), then as \( \alpha \) becomes large we would have

\[
\frac{p_1(0, 0; \beta)}{p(0, 0; \beta)} > \frac{1}{\alpha E[x|s]}
\]

which violates the first-order condition. Let \( \bar{\alpha} \) be the minimum \( \alpha \) such that \( u_s(\beta, \bar{\alpha}) = 0 \). By Assumption 2, \( p_1(u, u; \beta)/p(u, u; \beta) = \xi(\beta) \). For any \( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \), since \( u_s \) is increasing in \( \alpha \), \( u_s(\beta, \alpha) > 0 \). By the FOC we have

\[
\frac{1}{\alpha E[x|s] - u_s(\beta, \alpha)} = \frac{\xi(\beta)}{\alpha E[x|s]} = \frac{1}{\bar{\alpha} E[x|s]}
\]

Therefore, for \( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \),

\[
u_s(\beta, \alpha) = (\alpha - \bar{\alpha})E[x|s].
\]

and (14) follows.
Now we prove (13). Whenever $u_r(\beta, \alpha) > 0$, the FOC is satisfied:

$$\frac{\lambda(u, \alpha)}{\Pi_r(u, \alpha)} = \xi(\beta).$$

In particular, the FOC defines a function $F(u, \alpha)$ that, by a similar exercise to Lemma A.3, can be shown to satisfy Case 1 of Lemma A.4, hence $u_r(\beta, \alpha)$ is directionally differentiable in $\alpha$.\(^{19}\)

For notational simplicity, write $u_r(\beta, \alpha) = u_r(\alpha)$. Substituting in the optimal wage scheme, we can write the FOC as

$$\frac{\lambda(u_r(\alpha), \alpha)}{E[\alpha x|r] - \int_{S(u_r(\alpha), \alpha)} \alpha x f_A(x|r) dx} = \xi(\beta)$$

(15)

where

$$S(u_r(\alpha), \alpha) = A_{\lambda(u_r(\alpha), \alpha)} \cup (C_{\lambda(u_r(\alpha), \alpha)} \cap [0, q(u_r(\alpha), \alpha))]$$

for some appropriately chosen $q(u_r(\alpha), \alpha) \in [0, 1]$ and the sets $A_{\lambda}, C_{\lambda}, [0, q(u_r(\alpha), \alpha)]$ are as defined in the beginning of Appendix A.1 and Lemma A.1 (with the modification of scaling up $x$ to $\alpha x$).

Since $u_r(\alpha)$ is increasing in $\alpha$, (15) continues to hold for larger $\alpha$.

Assume to the contrary that at some $(\beta, \alpha)$ such that $u_r(\beta, \alpha) > 0$,

$$\frac{\partial u_r(\beta, \alpha+)}{\partial \alpha} < \frac{u_r(\beta, \alpha)}{\alpha}.$$  

(16)

Since

$$\frac{u_r(\alpha)}{\alpha} = \int_{S(u_r(\alpha), \alpha)} x f_A(x|r) dx$$

(17)

and

$$\frac{\partial u_r(\alpha)}{\partial \alpha} < 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial u_r(\beta, \alpha)}{\partial \alpha} < \frac{u_r(\beta, \alpha)}{\alpha},$$

\(^{19}\)To see this, note that $\lambda(tu, t\alpha) = \lambda(u, \alpha)$ and that $\Pi_r(tu, t\alpha) = t\Pi_r(u, \alpha)$ because everything (optimal wage, principal’s payoff) simply scale up by $t$. Letting $x = u/\alpha$, the FOC can then be written as $\lambda(x, 1)/\alpha \Pi_r(x, 1) = \xi(\beta)$. By Lemma A.4 (where $x$ plays the role of $u$ and $\alpha$ the role of $\beta$), the FOC defines an implicit function $x(\beta, \alpha)$ that is directionally differentiable in $\alpha$. Finally, let $u_r(\beta, \alpha) = \alpha x(\beta, \alpha)$. 

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implies that there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ such that for all $\alpha < \alpha' < \alpha + \epsilon$

$$\int_{S(u_r(\alpha'),\alpha')} \! xf_A(x|r)dx < \int_{S(u_r(\alpha),\alpha)} \! xf_A(x|r)dx \quad (18)$$

Thus for all $\alpha' \in (\alpha, \alpha + \epsilon)$, $\lambda(u_r(\alpha'), \alpha') \leq \lambda(u_r(\alpha), \alpha)$, as otherwise there will be an open set contained in $S(u_r(\alpha'), \alpha') \cap S(u_r(\alpha), \alpha)^c$ (by the continuity of $f(x|r)/f_A(x|r)$), leading to a contradiction of (18).

This means that the numerator of the LHS of (15) weakly decreases, while the denominator strictly increases, when $\alpha$ increases to any $\alpha' \in (\alpha, \alpha + \epsilon)$. This is a contradiction to (15) being satisfied for all $\alpha' > \alpha$. Therefore (13) is true. \qed

**Proof of Theorem 2.** The existence of cutoffs $\beta_r(\alpha) < \beta_s(\alpha)$ is given by Theorem 1.

We first show that $\beta_s(\cdot)$ is decreasing. It suffices to show that whenever $\Pi_s(\beta, \alpha) = \Pi_s^r(\beta, \alpha)$,

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_s}{\partial \alpha} < \frac{\partial \Pi_s^r}{\partial \alpha}, \quad (19)$$

where $\Pi_s(\beta, \alpha) = p(u_s(\beta, \alpha), u_s(\beta, \alpha); \beta)\Pi_s(u_s(\beta, \alpha), \alpha)$ and $\Pi_s^r(\beta, \alpha) = \max_{u \in [0, \alpha E[x|r]]} p(u, u_s(\beta, \alpha); \beta)\Pi_r(u, \alpha)$.\footnote{\textit{E}_r, \textit{E}_s, which will be used later, are defined in the same fashion.}

This single-crossing from below condition implies that as $\alpha$ increases, deviations to risky contracts from a safe equilibrium become more profitable.

Given $u$ and $\alpha$, let $w_q$ be the optimal wage scheme of the form in Lemma A.1 and $S(u, \alpha)$ be the set on which $w_q(x) = \alpha x$. Further, for a measurable set $S \subset [0, 1]$, we let $E[x|S] = \int_S xf(x)dx$. Then using this notation

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_s(u, \alpha)}{\partial \alpha} = E[x|s]$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_r(u, \alpha)}{\partial \alpha} = E[x|r] - \int_{S(u, \alpha)} \! xf(x|r)dx + \lambda(u, \alpha) \int_{S(u, \alpha)} \! xf_A(x|r)dx$$

$$= E[x|r, S^c(u, \alpha)] + \lambda(u, \alpha)E_A[x|r, S(u, \alpha)]$$

(16) implies that there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ such that for all $\alpha < \alpha' < \alpha + \epsilon$
where the second equality follows from applying the Envelope Theorem to the corresponding Lagrangian.

Suppose \( E\Pi_s(\beta, \alpha) = E\Pi_r^*(\beta, \alpha) \). That is,

\[
p(\lambda_s(\beta, \alpha), \lambda_s(\beta, \alpha); \beta)\Pi_s(\lambda_s(\beta, \alpha), \alpha) = p(\lambda_r^*(\beta, \alpha), \lambda_s(\beta, \alpha); \beta)\Pi_r(\lambda_r^*(\beta, \alpha), \alpha). \tag{20}
\]

Suppose that \( \alpha \neq \bar{\alpha} \) at the \((\beta, \alpha)\) such that (20) holds. For notational convenience, shorten \( \lambda_s(\alpha) = \lambda_s(\beta, \alpha), \lambda_r^*(\alpha) = \lambda_r^*(\beta, \alpha) \).

Note that \( \lambda(t\alpha, tu) = \lambda(\alpha, u) \) so it is homogeneous of degree zero. Furthermore, dividing by \( \alpha \) we obtain \( \lambda(\alpha, u) = \lambda(\frac{u}{\alpha}, 1) \). Then using Lemma A.3 we see that \( \lambda \) is directionally differentiable in \( \alpha \).

In addition, \( \Pi_r(tu, t\alpha) = t\Pi_r(u, \alpha) \) (homogeneous of degree one), and so \( \Pi_r(u, \alpha) = \alpha\Pi_r(\frac{u}{\alpha}, 1) \).

Let \( x = \frac{u}{\alpha} \). Then the FOC becomes \( \frac{\lambda(x)}{\alpha\Pi_r(x)} = \text{const} \). Thus we can prove using identical steps as Lemma A.5 that the derivative of the two sides of (20) with respect to \( \alpha \) are given by:

\[
E\Pi_s'(\alpha) = p_2(\lambda_s, \lambda_s; \beta)\Pi_s(\lambda_s, \alpha) + p(\lambda_s, \lambda_s; \beta)E[x|s], \tag{21}
\]

\[
(E\Pi_s')'(\alpha) = p_2(\lambda_r^*, \lambda_s; \beta)\Pi_r(\lambda_r^*, \alpha) + p(\lambda_r^*, \lambda_s; \beta)(E[x|r, S^c(\lambda_r^*, \alpha)] + \lambda(\lambda_r^*, \alpha)E_A[x|r, S(\lambda_r^*, \alpha)]). \tag{22}
\]

Divide each side of (20) by \( \alpha \) to get

\[
p(\lambda_s, \lambda_s; \beta) \left( E[x|s] - \frac{\lambda_s}{\alpha} \right) = p(\lambda_r^*, \lambda_s; \beta)E[x|r, S^c(\lambda_r^*, \alpha)] \tag{23}
\]

Substituting (23) into (22) and comparing it with (21), we obtain that (19) holds if and only if

\[
\frac{p_2(\lambda_s, \lambda_s; \beta)\Pi_s(\lambda_s, \alpha)}{\alpha} + p(\lambda_s, \lambda_s; \beta)\frac{\lambda_s}{\alpha} < \frac{p_2(\lambda_r^*, \lambda_s; \beta)\Pi_r(\lambda_r^*, \alpha)}{\alpha} + p(\lambda_r^*, \lambda_s; \beta)\lambda(\lambda_r^*, \alpha)E_A[x|r, S(\lambda_r^*, \alpha)] \tag{24}
\]
To further simplify (24), note that

\[ \lambda(u_r^r, \alpha) = \frac{p_1(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)}{p(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)} \Pi_r(u_r^r, \alpha) \]

\[ \Pi_s(u_s, \alpha) = \frac{p(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)}{p(u_s, u_s; \beta)} \Pi_r(u_r^r; \alpha) \]

\[ p(u_s, u_s, \alpha) = \frac{p(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)}{p(u_s, u_s; \beta)} \Pi_r(u_r^r; \alpha) = \frac{p(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)}{p(u_s, u_s; \beta)} \frac{p_1(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)}{p_1(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)} \Pi_r(u_r^r, \alpha) \]

\[ u_r^r = E_A[x|r, S(u_r^r, \alpha)] \]

The first equation uses the FOC \( u_r^r \) satisfies. The second equation is (20). The third equation uses (20) and the FOC \( u_s \) satisfies. The fourth is because the IR binds under the optimal wage scheme. Substituting these expressions to (24) and dividing each term by \( p(u_r^r, u_s; \beta) \Pi_r(u_r^r, \alpha) \), we obtain that (19) holds if and only if

\[ \frac{p_2(u_s, u_s; \beta)}{p(u_s, u_s; \beta)} u_s'(\alpha) + \frac{p_1(u_s, u_s; \beta)}{p(u_s, u_s; \beta)} u_s(\alpha) < \frac{p_2(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)}{p(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)} u_r^r(\alpha) + \frac{p_1(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)}{p(u_r^r, u_s; \beta)} u_r^r(\alpha). \]

For \( u_s > 0 \), the above inequality follows from \( \partial \ln p/\partial u_1 \) being decreasing in \( u_1 \), (12), Remark 5.1, and that \( u_r^r > u_s \). For \( u_s = 0 \), the above inequality follows since \( \frac{\partial u_s}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{u_s}{\alpha} = 0 \).

Finally, consider the case where \( \alpha = \pi \) at the \((\beta, \alpha)\) such that (20) holds. Then \( u_s(\beta, \alpha) \) is not differentiable, so the envelope theorem cannot be directly applied. However, a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.2 can be used to show that single-crossing still holds at this point. Thus \( \beta_s \) is decreasing.

To show that \( \beta_s \) is decreasing, we want to show that as \( \alpha \) increases, deviations to safe contracts from a risky equilibrium become relatively less profitable. It suffices to show that whenever

\[ E\Pi_r(\beta, \alpha) = E\Pi^*_r(\beta, \alpha), \]

we have

\[ \frac{\partial E\Pi_r(\alpha+)}{\partial \alpha} > \frac{\partial E\Pi^*_r(\alpha+)}{\partial \alpha}. \]

An similar calculation as above shows that (25) is true if and only if

\[ \frac{p_2(u_r^r, u_r; \beta)}{p(u_r^r, u_r; \beta)} u_r'(\alpha+) + \frac{p_1(u_r^r, u_r; \beta)}{p(u_r, u_r; \beta)} u_r^r(\alpha+) < \frac{p_2(u_r^r, u_r; \beta)}{p(u_r, u_r; \beta)} u_r^r(\alpha+) + \frac{p_1(u_r, u_r; \beta)}{p(u_r, u_r; \beta)} u_r(\alpha) \]
which follows from $\partial \ln p/\partial u_1$ being decreasing in $u_1$, (13), Remark 5.1, and that $u^*_r < u_r$. A parallel equation holds for the left-hand derivatives.

Finally we are left to show that $\lim_{\alpha \to \infty} \beta_s(\alpha) = 0$. To start, observe that

$$\Pi_s(\alpha u^*, \alpha) = \Pi_r(\alpha u^*, \alpha).$$

where $u^*$ is the reservation utility that makes a principal indifferent between implementing $a = s$ or $a = r$ when there is no scaling: we can cancel out $\alpha$ on both sides of the equation and recover the same equation that defines $u^*$. Consequently, after scaling the principal is better off implementing the risky action whenever she has to offer the agent an indirect utility higher than $\alpha u^*$.

It then follows from (14) and the fact that $u^* < E[x|s]$ that for any $\beta > 0$, $u_s(\beta, \alpha) > \alpha u^*$ when $\alpha$ is sufficiently large. Therefore deviations to risky actions will eventually become profitable. This implies that $\lim_{\alpha \to \infty} \beta_s(\alpha) < \beta$ for all $\beta > 0$, and the claim follows.

**Proof of Theorem 3.** Using the same method as in Proposition 3.1 we can show that $\Pi_r(\cdot, L)$ is concave for each $L$. Since $\Pi_r(E[x|s], L) > 0$ and $\Pi_s(E[x|s], L) = 0$, it suffices to prove the proposition for $u = 0$.\(^{21}\) Therefore we suppress $u$ and simply write $\Pi_r(L)$.

By the standard Lagrangian argument in Appendix A.1., the optimal risky contract is given by

$$w(x) = \begin{cases} 
-L, & x \in S^c(L) \\
x, & x \in S(L)
\end{cases}$$

for a set $S(L)$ of the form $S(L) = A_{\lambda(L)} \cup (C_{\lambda(L)} \cap [0, q(L)])$ for some number $q(L)$. In particular, $S(L), S^c(L)$ are Borel sets.

Observe also that $\lambda(L)$ increases to $M$ as $L \to \infty$ and that $S(L)$ approaches the entire interval $[0, 1]$ in the sense that the measure of $S^c(L)$ goes to zero.

The profit under the optimal contract is given by

$$\Pi_r(L) = E[L + x|r, S^c(L)]$$

\(^{21}\)By concavity of $\Pi_r(\cdot, L)$ and the argument in Proposition 3.1, $\Pi_r(u, L) > \Pi_s(u, L)$ for all $u \geq 0$. 

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s.t. $E_A[x|S(L)] = E_A[L|r, S^c(L)]$. In particular, $\Pi_r(L)$ is non-decreasing in $L$.

Substituting the agent’s IR constraint, we have

$$\Pi_r(L) = \frac{P(S^c(L)|r)}{P_A(S^c(L)|r)} E_A[x|S(L)] + E[x|S^c(L)]$$

$$= \int_{S^c(L)} \frac{f(x|r)}{f_A(x|r)} f_A(x|r) dx E_A[x|S(L)] + E[x|S^c(L)]$$

where $P_A(S^c(L)|r) = E_A[1|r, S^c(L)] = \int_{S^c(L)} f_A(x|r) dx$.

Fix an $\epsilon > 0$ so that $E_A[x|S(L)] > E_A[x|S^c(L)]$.

Choose $L_1$ s.t. whenever $L > L_1$,

$$E_A[x|S(L)] > E_A[x|S^c(L)]$$

Choose $L_2$ such that $\lambda(L_2) > 1$. Then whenever $L > \max\{L_1, L_2\}$,

$$\Pi_r(L) > E_A[x|S(L)] > E_A[x|S^c(L)]$$

Therefore, whenever $L$ is sufficiently large, any equilibrium must prescribe the risky action.

Proof of Theorem 4. Denote the principal’s optimal profit for implementing the risky action with indirect utility $u$ by $\Pi_r(u, L)$. Denote the relevant value functions by $E\Pi_s(u, L)$, $E\Pi_s^r(u, L)$, $E\Pi_r(u, L)$, $E\Pi_r^s(u, L)$ like before.

For each $L$, the proof of the existence of the cutoffs $\beta_s(L)$ and $\beta_r(L)$ follows from identical steps as in Theorem 1.

We argue that $\beta_s(\cdot)$ must decrease in $L$. This is because the payoff from the risky action deviation is higher at every level of $\beta$ than before, while $E\Pi_s(\beta, L)$ is the same for all $L \geq 0$ because $L$ does not affect the principal’s payoff from implementing the safe action. Therefore, for each $\beta$, the deviation to a risky contract from a safe equilibrium becomes more profitable as $L$ increases.

We next show that $\beta_r(\cdot)$ will decrease. For each $L$, let $u_r(\beta, L)$ be the symmetric equilibrium of the auxiliary game $p(u_i, u_{-i}; \beta)\Pi_r(u_i, L)$. Note that $u_r(\beta, \cdot)$ is increasing in $L$ if
$u_r(\beta, 0) > 0$. To see this, note that the FOC for the symmetric equilibrium is

$$\frac{p_1(u, u; \beta)}{p(u, u; \beta)} = \lambda(u, L) \frac{\Pi_r(u, L)}{\Pi_r(u, L)}$$

When $L$ increases, the left-hand side is unchanged, but the right-hand side has a larger denominator and a smaller numerator. Thus the FOC will be satisfied at a higher level of $u$.

Now we show that at every level of $\beta$, the safe action deviation will be relatively worse than before. Suppose that at some $(\beta_r, L_r)$ the two functions intersect. Let $u_r$ denote $u_r(\beta_r, L_r)$ and $u^s_r$ denote $u^s_r(\beta_r, L_r)$.

Then by a similar argument as in Lemma A.5, we can show that the right derivatives with respect to $L_r$ equal

$$E\Pi'_r(\beta_r, L_r+) = p_2(u_r, u_r; \beta_r)u'_r(L_r+)\Pi_r(u_r, L_r) + p(u_r, u_r; \beta_r)\Pi'_r(u_r, L_r+)$$

$$E\Pi'_s(\beta_r, L_r+) = p_2(u^s_r, u_r; \beta_r)u'_r(L_r+)\Pi_s(u^s_r, L_r) + p(u^s_r, u_r; \beta_r)\Pi'_s(u^s_r, L_r+)$$

We note that $\Pi'_s(u^s_r, L_r+) = 0$ since the safe action is not affected by $L$, and $\frac{\partial \Pi_r(u_r, L_r)}{\partial L} > 0$ since the risky action’s profit increases in $L$. Then, since $E\Pi_r(\beta_r, L_r) = p(u_r, u_r; \beta_r)\Pi_r(u_r, L_r) = p(u^s_r, u_r; \beta_r)\Pi_s(u^s_r, L_r) = E\Pi'_r(\beta_r, L_r)$, after substitution and cancellation we obtain

$$E\Pi'_r(\beta_r, L_r+) > (E\Pi'_s(\beta_r, L_r+)$$

This holds from our assumptions on $p$ since $u^s_r(\beta_r, L_r) < u_r(\beta_r, L_r)$. A similar argument shows the inequality also holds for the left derivatives. Therefore whenever these two expected profit functions cross, the $E\Pi_r(\beta_r, L_r)$ must cross from below.

Because of this single crossing from below, we know that higher levels of $L$ will make the safe action relatively worse. Thus $\beta_r(\cdot)$ is decreasing in $L$. \qed
Asymmetric Pure-strategy Nash Equilibria Do Not Exist

In this section we show that there is no asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the competing principals game.

To do so, we establish two lemmas.

**Lemma B.1.** There is no equilibrium \((w_1, a_1), (w_2, a_2)\) such that \(a_1 = a_2\) but \(E_A[w_1|a_1] \neq E_A[w_2|a_2]\).

**Proof.** Assume to the contrary that \(a_1 = a_2 = a\) but \(u_1 = E_A[w_1|a] < u_2 = E_A[w_2|a]\). Since equilibrium is a mutual best response, \(u_1, u_2\) satisfy the FOCs

\[
\frac{p_1(u_1, u_2; \beta)}{p(u_1, u_2; \beta)} \leq \frac{-\Pi'_a(u_1)}{\Pi_a(u_1)}, \quad u_1 \geq 0, \text{ with complementary slackness.}
\]

\[
\frac{p_1(u_2, u_1; \beta)}{p(u_2, u_1; \beta)} = \frac{-\Pi'_a(u_2)}{\Pi_a(u_2)}.
\]

By Assumption 1, \(p_1/p\) is non-increasing in the first argument and non-decreasing in the second argument. Therefore we have

\[
\frac{p_1(u_1, u_2; \beta)}{p(u_1, u_2; \beta)} \geq \frac{p_1(u_2, u_1; \beta)}{p(u_2, u_1; \beta)}.
\]

Since \(-\Pi'_a(u)/\Pi_a(u)\) is increasing in \(u\) for either \(a = s\) or \(a = r\), we have

\[
\frac{-\Pi'_a(u_1)}{\Pi_a(u_1)} < \frac{-\Pi'_a(u_2)}{\Pi_a(u_2)},
\]

which is a contradiction. \(\square\)

Therefore, if there is an asymmetric equilibrium, the two principals must choose different \(a\)'s. To show that this case is also impossible, we need another lemma.

**Lemma B.2.** Let

\[
V_s(u_2) = \max_{u \in [0, E_A[x|s]]} p(u, u_2; \beta)\Pi_s(u)
\]

\[
V_r(u_2) = \max_{u \in [0, E_A[x|r]]} p(u, u_2; \beta)\Pi_r(u)
\]

where \(u_2 \geq 0\). Then if \(V_s, V_r\) ever cross each other, it must be that \(V_r\) crosses \(V_s\) from below.
Proof. Let $u_s(u_2)$ be the maximizer of $V_s(u_2)$ and $u_r(u_2)$ be the maximizer of $V_r(u_2)$. Then they satisfy the first-order condition

$$\frac{p_1(u, u_2; \beta)}{p(u, u_2; \beta)} \leq -\frac{\Pi'_a(u)}{\Pi_a(u)}, u \geq 0,$$

with complementary slackness for $a = s, r$ respectively. Then the standard implicit function theorem shows that $u_s(\cdot)$ is differentiable and Lemma A.4 where $u_2$ plays the role of $\beta$ shows $u_r(\cdot)$ is directionally differentiable. In particular, the Envelope Theorem applies to $V_s, V_r$. Furthermore, Lemma A.6 shows that $1/\Pi_s(u) > -\Pi'_r(u)/\Pi_r(u)$ for all $u \geq 0$. Therefore, $u_s(u_2) < u_r(u_2)$ for all $u_2 \geq 0$.

Suppose $V_r, V_s$ cross at $\hat{u}$. Then

$$p(u_s(\hat{u}), \hat{u}; \beta)\Pi_s(u_s(\hat{u})) = p(u_r(\hat{u}), \hat{u}; \beta)\Pi_r(u_r(\hat{u})) \quad (26)$$

By the Envelope Theorem,

$$V'_s(\hat{u}) = p_2(u_s(\hat{u}), \hat{u}; \beta)\Pi_s(u_s(\hat{u}))$$

$$V'_r(\hat{u}) = p_2(u_r(\hat{u}), \hat{u}; \beta)\Pi_r(u_r(\hat{u}))$$

Substituting (26), we then have

$$V'_r(\hat{u}) > V'_s(\hat{u}) \iff \frac{p_2(u_s(\hat{u}), \hat{u}; \beta)}{p(u_s(\hat{u}), \hat{u}; \beta)} < \frac{p_2(u_r(\hat{u}), \hat{u}; \beta)}{p(u_r(\hat{u}), \hat{u}; \beta)}$$

Since $p_2/p$ is increasing in $u_1$ and that $u_s(\hat{u}) < u_r(\hat{u})$, the latter inequality is true. This completes the proof.

Now we are ready to prove non-existence.

**Proposition B.1.** There exists no asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the competing-principals game.

**Proof.** By Lemma B.1, if there is an asymmetric equilibrium, it must be of the form $(w_1, s), (w_2, r)$. Let $u_s = E_A[w_1(x)|s]$ and $u_r = E_A[w_2(x)|r]$. Since they are Nash equilibrium indirect utilities, by Proposition 3.1,

$$u_s \leq u^* \leq u_r. \quad (27)$$
Claim: At least an inequality in (27) must be strict. To see this, note that if \( u_r = u_s = u^* \), then because \((w_1, s)\) is a best response,

\[
p_1(u^*; u^*; \beta)\Pi_s(u^*) + p\Pi'_s(u^*) = 0 \tag{28}
\]

Since \( \Pi'_r(u^*) > \Pi'_s(u^*) = -1 \) (See Figure 1), (28) leads to

\[
p_1(u^*; u^*; \beta)\Pi_r(u^*) + p\Pi'_r(u^*) > 0
\]

which contradicts the fact that \((w_2, r)\) is a best response. This proves the claim. Accordingly, \( u_s < u_r \).

Since \((w_1, s), (w_2, r)\) is an equilibrium, each principal has no incentive to deviate to implementing a different action. That is to say,

\[
V_r(u_s) \geq V_s(u_s) \\
V_s(u_r) \geq V_r(u_r). \tag{29}
\]

Since \( u_s < u_r \), (29) implies that \( V_r \) crosses \( V_s \) from above, which contradicts Lemma B.2. \( \square \)
References


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