

# Applying the Data and Tools: Development of Macroprudential Policy for Financial Stability

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Financial Stability Analysis: Using the Tools, Finding the  
Data Conference

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# Based on the recent work

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- 1. Econometric Measures of Connectedness and Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors**  
Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo and Lioriana Pelizzon, *Journal of Financial Economics*, Volume 104, Issue 3, June 2012, Pages 536-559
- 2. On a New Approach for Analyzing and Managing Macrofinancial Risks**  
Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Dale Gray, Robert C. Merton, Andrew W. Lo, and Lioriana Pelizzon, *Financial Analysts Journal*, Volume 69, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 22-33
- 3. Sovereign, Bank, and Insurance Credit Spreads: Connectedness and System Networks**  
Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Dale Gray, Robert C. Merton, Andrew W. Lo, and Lioriana Pelizzon, Working Paper
- 4. Chapter in IMF Global Financial Stability Report on Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (Chapter 2, Box 2.1 Interconnectedness Between Sovereigns and Financial Institutions)** Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Dale Gray, Robert C. Merton, Andrew W. Lo, and Lioriana Pelizzon. Edited by IMF, 2013

# Objectives

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- Analyzing and managing **sovereign risk**, the **risks of financial institutions**, and the interactions among sovereigns and financial institutions are important for financial stability
- Concentrate on **credit**
- **CDS** values do not fully account for default risk, as they only reflect the default after the first loss. **Underestimated** due to values of guarantees.
- Important to account for implicit and explicit **guarantees**
- We propose **Expected Loss Ratios** (based on CCA) and **network measures** to analyze financial system interactions and **systemic risk**


# On and OFF-Balance Sheet Credit Assets and Liabilities US Government 2010

**Table 1: Credit-related Assets and Liabilities of the U.S. Government, 2010**  
(billions of dollars)

Assets		Liabilities	
Direct loans	828	Treasury debt held by public	9,060
Guaranteed loans	1,867	Off-balance-sheet guaranteed loan financing	1,867
Mortgages guaranteed or held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac	5,321	Fannie and Freddie debt	1,453
		Fannie and Freddie MBSs	3,868
Other federally-backed credit (FDIC, FHLBs, FCS, PBGC, Federal Reserve loans and SIVs)	10,140	Off-balance-sheet financing of other federally-backed credit	10,140
		Taxpayer/stakeholder equity	-8,232

Source: Author's tabulations based on Treasury Financial Statements, FDIC and Federal Reserve Releases, OMB Analytical Perspectives, and FHFA 2010 Annual Report to Congress  
From *Credit Policy as Fiscal Policy*, Deborah Lucas, MIT, November 15, 2011, p. 29

# Feedback Loops of Risk from Explicit and Implicit Guarantees



# Measuring Connectivity and Influence on Credit Ratings Between Sovereigns and Financial Institutions

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- Expected Loss Ratio = Guarantee/Riskfree Debt  
=  $PUT/B \exp[-rT]$   
= ELR
- Fair Value CDS Spread =  $-\log(1 - ELR)/T$
- $ELR_k(t) = a_{jk} + b_{jk} ELR_j(t-1) + \varepsilon_t$   
 $ELR_j(t) = a_{kj} + b_{jk} ELR_k(t-1) + \zeta_t$
- If  $b_{jk}$  is significantly  $> 0$ , then j influences k
- If  $b_{kj}$  is significantly  $> 0$ , then k influences j
- If both are significantly  $> 0$ , then there is feedback, mutual influence, between j and k.

# Data

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- Sample: Jan 01-Mar12
- Monthly frequency
- Entities:
  - 17 Sovereigns
  - 63 Banks
  - 39 Insurance Companies
- Moody's KMV CreditEdge:
  - Expected Loss Ratio (ELR)

*Sovereign, Bank, and  
Insurance Credit Spreads:  
Connectedness and  
System Networks. M.  
Billio, M. Getmansky, D.  
Gray, A. Lo, R. Merton, L.  
Pelizzon, 2012*


# Network Measures

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- Degrees
  - Indegree (**IN**): number of incoming connections
  - Outdegree (**FROM**): number of outgoing connections
  - Totdegree: Indegree + Outdegree
- Connectivity
  - Number of node connected: Number of nodes reachable following the directed path
  - **Average Shortest Path**: The average number of steps required to reach the connected nodes
- Centrality
  - **Eigenvector Centrality** (EC): The more the node is connected to central nodes (nodes with high EC) the more is central (higher EC)




# Connectedness July 2004-June 2007: Sovereigns, Banks, and Insurance Companies



*Sovereign, Bank, and Insurance Credit Spreads:  
Connectedness and System Networks. M. Billio, M.  
Getmansky, D. Gray, A. Lo, R. Merton, L. Pelizzon, 2012*


# Connectedness April 2009-March 2012: Sovereigns, Banks, and Insurance Companies



**Sovereign, Bank, and Insurance Credit Spreads:  
Connectedness and System Networks.** M. Billio, M.  
Getmansky, D. Gray, A. Lo, R. Merton, L. Pelizzon, 2012

# Connectedness to Greece: August 2008

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


Blue Insurance  
Black Sovereign  
Red Bank

*Sovereign, Bank, and Insurance Credit Spreads:  
Connectedness and System Networks.* M. Billio, M.  
Getmansky, D. Gray, A. Lo, R. Merton, L. Pelizzon, 2012


← Greece

# Connectedness to Spain: December 2011



*Sovereign, Bank, and Insurance Credit Spreads: Connectedness and System Networks.*  
M. Billio, M. Getmansky, D. Gray, A. Lo, R. Merton, L. Pelizzon, 2012


# Connectedness to Italy and US: March 2012



**Blue Insurance**  
**Black Sovereign**  
**Red Bank**


*Sovereign, Bank, and Insurance Credit Spreads: Connectedness and System Networks.* M. Billio, M. Getmansky, D. Gray, A. Lo, R. Merton, L. Pelizzon, 2012

# Connectedness to Italy: March 2012




Blue Insurance  
Black Sovereign  
Red Bank

# Network Measures: FROM and TO Sovereign




17 X 102= 1734 potential connections FROM (TO)

# Network Measures: FROM Sovereign







# Network Measures: TO Sovereign



# Network Measures: FROM and TO Sovereign



# Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain: GIIPS



# Conclusion

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- The system of banks, insurance companies, and sovereigns in our sample is highly dynamically connected
- Important to use the right data to measure interconnectedness
- Sovereigns are interconnected with other sovereigns
- Network measures allow for early warnings and assessment of the system complexity

# Functional Description of Being a Lender or Guarantor of Debt When There is Risk of Default

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RISKY DEBT + GUARANTEE OF DEBT = RISK-FREE DEBT

RISKY DEBT = RISK-FREE DEBT - GUARANTEE OF DEBT

Corporation	
Operating Assets, A	Debt (face value B), D
	Common Stock, E


$$A = D + E$$

IN DEFAULT, THE HOLDER OF THE GUARANTEE RECEIVES PROMISED VALUE OF THE DEBT MINUS VALUE OF ASSETS RECOVERED FROM DEFAULTING ENTITY =  $\text{MAX}[0, B - A]$

**VALUE OF GUARANTEE = PUT OPTION ON THE ASSETS OF BORROWER**

**CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS ARE GUARANTEES OF DEBT AND THEREFORE ARE PUT OPTIONS ON THE ASSETS OF THE BORROWER**

# Non-linear Macro Risk Buildup



# General Measures of Credit Connectedness and Influence among Institutions: Linear Granger Causality Tests

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$$X_t = \sum_{j=1}^m a_j X_{t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^m b_j Y_{t-j} + \epsilon_t$$

$$Y_t = \sum_{j=1}^m c_j X_{t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^m d_j Y_{t-j} + \eta_t$$

- $Y \Rightarrow_G X$  if  $\{b_j\}$  is different from 0
- $X \Rightarrow_G Y$  if  $\{c_j\}$  is different from 0
- If both  $\{b_j\}$  and  $\{c_j\}$  are different from 0, feedback relation
- Test is robust to autocorrelation and heteroschedasticity